

Political Reform and the Historical Trajectories of U.S. Social Movements in the Twentieth Century

Edwin Amenta, *University of California, Irvine*

Neal Caren, *University of North Carolina*

James E. Stobaugh, *University of California, Irvine*

We propose a political reform theory, a political and historical institutionalist argument that holds that shifts in political structures, partisan regimes and policy greatly influence movements. We appraise this argument, along with resource mobilization, political opportunity and media alternatives, by analyzing 600,000 articles in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* that mention national U.S. social movement organizations (SMOs) in the largest 34 SMO industries across the twentieth century. We provide multivariate analyses of industry-level article mentions of SMOs and detailed analyses of the historical trajectories of coverage across the century. Although we find some support for major theories of movements and media influences, the political reform theory is strongly supported and outperforms standard political opportunity models. We conclude with suggestions to synthesize theories and for research on movement and media outcomes.

We elaborate and appraise a “political reform” argument that attributes patterns in social movement organization (SMO) presence in part to the historical rhythms of partisan political dominance and policymaking. The political reform model relies on political institutional influences (Amenta 2005) and the historical institutionalist insight that changes in policy alter politics (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). Diverging from the expectations of standard political opportunity models, we argue that the major regime shifts, both left *and* right, provide short-term spurs to movements. Moreover, we argue that domestic policy reforms provide extensive legitimation and staging bases for political action among existing SMOs, bolstering them long after the initial causes of the new policy have passed, rather than leading to the decline of the movement.

Although social movements theories are typically tested against data concerning only one or a few movements or organizations over a short period of time, we analyze the 34 largest U.S. movement industries (McCarthy and Zald 1977) with data on approximately 600,000 *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* articles mentioning any U.S. SMO across the twentieth century. Scholars have made comparisons across many SMOs over long stretches of time (e.g., Gamson 1990), several movements or movement industries (e.g., Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Soule and King 2008) or a few movements across a few countries (e.g., della Porta and Rucht 1995; Giugni 2004) in delimited time periods, but until now no one has ever analyzed so many movements over such a long period.

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In our analyses, we focus on SMOs, which have been key to social movement research since the 1970s (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1977), and we aggregate our analyses to the social movement “industry” (McCarthy and Zald 1977) or “issue family” level (cf. della Porta and Rucht 1995 on ideologically similar movement “families”). As we show below, this measure of coverage provides a valid indicator of movement presence at this level of analysis, because for the largest SMO or movement industries, the frequency with which they appear in newspaper articles is closely correlated with often-used measures of their size and activity, such as their membership and organizational density (Amenta, Caren, Olasky and Stobaugh 2009). Also, these figures can be corrected to address strictly media influences on them. With the extensive data on coverage, spanning 100 years, the 34 largest SMO industries, and 1,440 SMOs – including every national SMO that receives significant coverage in these two newspapers – we provide some basic assessments of the political reform argument as well as some of the major theories of movements.

Although our pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression analyses provide some support for established perspectives, confirming their value, they also provide key support for the political reform theory, especially where it conflicts with the standard political opportunity model. That is, despite controlling for indicators from major theories of movements and media-related controls, the political reform measures significantly influence newspaper article mentions of SMOs. Examining detailed patterns of coverage over time, moreover, we also find that political reform ideas do better than standard political opportunity arguments in explaining several features of coverage: why SMO coverage and national SMO presence were so lacking in the early and late parts of the century; why the 1930s wave of coverage was larger than the 1960s one; why movement coverage remains higher after a policy reform, notably for the African American civil rights movement; and through the analysis of a small wave of social movement coverage spurred by a conservative regime in the 1980s. We turn to the political reform model.

The Political Reform Model

Rooted in political institutional concepts, the political reform model holds that SMOs are shaped by the structure of the polity and changes in it (Amenta 2005), regime changes (Amenta 1998; Pierson 1996), state-building (Tilly 2005; Skocpol 2003) and policy-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Berry 1999). The key components of the model include the centralization of the polity and the modernization of the party system, the appearance of highly partisan regimes and major policy shifts. SMO trajectories are dependent on large-scale alterations in the polity and closely tied to the rhythms of policy-making. In the following, we discuss our expectations for this model generally, how we expect the processes to work in the U.S. context, and how political reform expectations differ from those of the standard political opportunity model.

The political reform model addresses first structural influences on politics and policy, notably the nature of political authority and the party system. We argue that more centralized political systems promote movement activity as do nonpatronage-oriented

or open party systems. The centralization of politics promotes a nationalization of grievance formation and political activity (Tilly 2005). Patronage-oriented parties tend to deflect organizations making new demands on governmental authority (Mayhew 1986). Applying these insights to the U.S. situation, the power-sharing nature of the U.S. polity hindered SMOs, but the central or “federal” government began to emerge out of the fiscal and functional shadows by 1920, eclipsing local governments in the 1930s (Amenta 1998), inducing SMOs to focus on national issues (Skocpol 2003). We also argue that a preliminary condition to the rise to prominence of national SMOs in the U.S. setting was the attack during the first two decades of the twentieth century on the patronage party system (Mayhew 1986). Afterward, the major parties became weak catchall entities, open to the influence of U.S. political organizations, which, however, unlike many European counterparts, have been unable to create viable national parties because of barriers to entry based in electoral rules (Schwartz and Lawson 2005).

The political reform model also expects waves of SMO coverage and public presence to be driven by major periods of partisan regime dominance – either left or right wing. Under left-wing or right-wing regimes the possibility of major changes in policy and permanent shifts in the relationships between states and citizens are viewed as being plausible. Thus, these regimes will provoke SMO mobilization, both offensive and defensive. Our argument resembles that of standard political opportunity models in that we expect left regimes to promote left movement activity (McAdam 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004); similarly we expect right regimes to spur right movement activity. However, we diverge from standard political opportunity arguments in that we also expect left regimes to spur movements of the right and right regimes to spur the more prevalent movements of the left. Right-wing regimes will incite the defensive mobilization of left movements, as they seek retrenchment, or rolling back rights and cutting specific programs and taxes to forestall domestic policy (Pierson 1996). By contrast, standard political opportunity models expect right regimes to slow the mobilization of nonright movements, as political opportunities “close.” Also, the standard opportunity model would see mixed regimes or regimes of moderate partisanship to be moderately influential in spurring movements, but we view them as having no independent effect.

In the twentieth century, the two major U.S. parties began to polarize, with Republicans increasingly becoming allied with business organizations and promoting antistatist policies, and northern Democrats affiliating with labor and left political organizations and promoting the growth of the national state and new social policies. Democrats from the South often allied with Republicans until near the end of the twentieth century, after legislative and legal reforms initiated the democratization of the South. In the twentieth century, power was taken by left-wing partisan regimes – the presidency being held by a liberal Democrat and a liberal Congress, defined as being dominated by Democrats from democratic polities (Amenta 1998) – only from 1935 through 1938, and from 1965 through 1966. Periods of right-wing rule, defined as the presidency being held by a conservative Republican and Congress being conservative, as defined by being Republican-dominated, occurred more frequently, in the 1921-1932 and 1981-1982.

The political reform model also expects movements to be stimulated by major domestic policy adoptions and augmentations, relying on the historical institutionalist insight that policy changes influence future politics (Pierson and Skocpol 2002), including movement politics. Unlike the impact of highly partisan regimes, we argue that policy changes influence SMOs in ways that are neither gradual nor symmetrical, bolstering movements long after their initial wave of contention. Policy-making makes political players of groups so favored by it, providing enduring lifts to the SMO industry or issue family (Berry 1999). Policies provide legitimation for groups making demands regarding an issue and the grievances they express (Amenta 2005), making it easier for SMOs to recruit and gain support. Policies provide SMOs something to focus on and fight over, usually for improvements, such as greater coverage or benefits, in the case of programs that provide cash benefits, such as veterans, old age or unemployment programs or greater enforcement, as in the case of regulations in antidiscrimination legislation, collective bargaining rights or environmental protection. Policies typically identify the groups that will benefit from them and make them easier to mobilize, as in the case of old age policies; these policies also provide movements with long-term political leverage, as politicians expect organized resistance to their retrenchment (Pierson 1996). Our views stand in opposition to models of movements that expect them to decline after policy gains. No matter how policy changes occur, we expect new and augmented domestic policies to shape the prospects and activity of SMOs in ways that are not smooth.

In U.S. history, new policies have been initiated in “punctuated equilibria” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and in “big bangs” of legislation (Skocpol 1992), which have appeared during the left regimes, but policies also have been enacted by divided government (Mayhew 1991) and consolidated or by the consolidation and augmentation of previous reforms (Amenta 1998). All are expected to influence movements. And so the model expects movement benefits from the dramatic policy changes, such as the National Labor Relations Act and Social Security Act of 1935 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which passed during the Democratic-dominated regimes of the 1930s and 1960s. But movement gains are also expected from policy reforms that happened outside these periods, such as the passage of the so-called GI Bill (Servicemen’s Readjustment Act) of 1944, the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 and the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Although there may be some increased media coverage from movements due to discussion of these policies, our expectation is that SMO industries will benefit through organization and activity spurred by these policy adoptions and augmentations.

Thus, the political reform model has two main testable expectations for SMO activity in the U.S. case across the twentieth century. First, it expects *social movement presence and activity to be buttressed by both left-wing and right-wing partisan regimes*. These highly partisan regimes should influence all movements, not just those ideologically similar to the regimes, and should manifest itself in waves of activity. Second, it expects *long-term influence from policy reforms on SMO industries benefiting from them*. These policy reforms are not expected to influence all movement industries, only those

winning benefits. Also, these effects are expected to be long-term and thus movements benefiting from reforms are expected to be boosted and not fall back to prereform levels of presence or activity.

Although both political reform and standard political opportunity arguments refer to macrolevel political conditions, each main claim of the political reform model stands in opposition to standard views of political opportunity. The political reform model focuses on specific aspects of political institutions – polity centralization, party systems, democratization – and partisan regimes and changes in policy (Amenta and Halfmann 2011), rather than the political openness and elite allies (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996) of political opportunity models. The political reform model sees polity centralization as spurring movements, whereas from the standard political opportunity perspective, power-sharing polities are viewed as providing more opportunities for mobilization (Kriesi 2004). The political reform model focuses on the rare moments when partisan imbalances are extremely in favor of the left, or right, whereas the political opportunity model views only left political formations to be open or providing allies for movements with those further to the right to be “closed” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), discouraging at least nonright-wing movements. The political reform model also sees new policies as having long-lasting buoyant forces on movements benefitting from them, whereas the political opportunity model views policy reform as an end point of a cycle of mobilization and a harbinger of decline (McAdam 1982). For all these reasons, the political reform model expects waves of activity, once preconditions have been met, in the wake of partisan regimes and major policy changes, and with less symmetrical results.

Data and Methods

To address the arguments, we count the times that U.S. SMOs are mentioned in articles in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* in a given year and aggregate these “article mentions” to the SMO industry level (McCarthy and Zald 1977). To conceptualize SMOs, we rely on standard definitions (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1990). For McCarthy and Zald (1977), SMOs are formal organizations whose goals are allied with those of a social movement and attempts to implement those goals (cf. Snow, Soule and Kriesi 2004; see also Gamson 1990; Berry 1999). We include only *politically* inflected organizations, and, like Gamson (1990), we include only organizations with *national* goals. We also include what McCarthy and Zald call an “established SMO,” one that has won new benefits or achieved some degree of acceptance. Included as well in this definition are what others call “advocacy organizations” (Andrews and Edwards 2004) and “public interest” or “citizens” groups (Berry 1999), but not all “interest groups,” such as political organizations representing business interests or professions, or the major parties (see Appendix). To identify the relevant SMOs, we used sources ranging from examining extant lists of SMOs and monographs on movements to writing experts on individual movements (for details, see Amenta et al. 2009) and identified 1,440 qualifying SMOs. We then searched over the twentieth century for all articles mentioning SMOs in the *Times* and *Post* through ProQuest Historical Newspapers, with 1,258 of them receiving coverage in the *Times*

and 1,140 in the *Post*. Altogether we identified 356,380 article mentions of SMOs in the *Times* and 251,521 in the *Post*, the data for which run through 1994.¹

From here we divided the article mentions into 34 different movement industries or issue families, including three residual categories: “progressive,” “conservative” and “civil rights other.” The movement categories correspond to well-known ones used by movement scholars and with broad lines of policy change sought by movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977), and require a threshold of coverage to avoid being categorized with the residual industries and to ensure that our analyses are not dominated by many tiny movement industries (see Table 1). (Although if two or more different SMOs are mentioned in a given article, that article counts as an “article mention” for each SMO, for SMO industry scores there is no double counting for an individual article.) Of the 34, five are deemed “conservative,” including the nativist, Christian right, antiabortion, gun rights, and “conservative” movement industries. In the *Times*, the most covered SMO industries were, in order, labor, African American civil rights, veterans, feminism, nativism, progressive, and environmental. In the *Post*, the order was similar, except that veterans came in second and African American civil rights third (see Table 1). The correlation of coverage at the industry-year level between the *Times* and the *Post* is .85.

The article-mention counts of SMOs – when aggregated to the industry level – provide a useful indicator of movement presence, by which we mean size and activity. These counts correlate closely with some other measures used to approximate movement presence by scholars testing movement theories. For instance, from 1955 through 1986, the number of articles in the *New York Times* mentioning national feminist SMOs correlates at .97 with the number of protest and advocacy organizations existing in that movement issue family, and from 1954 through 1999, the number of articles mentioning organizations in the labor movement correlates .80 with unionization (for more, see Amenta et al. 2009). In addition, as we show below, it is possible to control for strictly media influences on this measure. Although article mentions are limited like all measures of movement scope, activity, presence or influence, unlike all other indicators previously employed in research, counts of SMOs mentioned in articles are available for long stretches of time and across all the major movements, making extensive analyses possible.

We appraise our arguments in two main ways. First, we provide negative binomial regression results on pooled article counts data across 34 movement industries over the twentieth century. In these analyses, we model and control for measures based on the major theories of social movements as well as for possible newspaper-related influences on SMO industry coverage. We follow up these analyses by comparing the expectations of political reform theory with political opportunity arguments in three analyses of waves of coverage: the entire pattern of SMO coverage across the twentieth century, the trajectory of coverage in the African American civil rights movement peaking in the 1960s, and the mini-wave of coverage in the early 1980s during the right-wing regime under President Ronald Reagan.

Table 1: *New York Times* (1900-1999) and *Washington Post* (1900-1992) Coverage of SMO Industries, Counts of SMOs in Industry and Conservative SMO Industries

	Movement Industry	Times Percent of Coverage	Post Percent of Coverage	# of SMOs in Industry	Conservative
1	Labor	40.2	29.7	143	
2	Civil rights, Black	8.5	8.7	67	
3	Veterans	6.3	14.4	19	
4	Feminism/women's rights	4.7	7.5	126	
5	Nativist/supremacist	4.2	4.8	63	X
6	Progressive	3.8	3.6	103	
7	Environment/conservation/ecology	3.6	3.6	130	
8	Civil rights, Jewish	3.3	1.4	11	
9	Conservative	3.0	3.0	98	X
10	Civil liberties	2.7	2.4	6	
11	Antiwar	2.5	2.0	76	
12	Antialcohol	2.2	2.9	21	
13	Farmers	1.9	1.8	18	
14	Children's rights/protection	1.5	2.2	13	
15	Communist	1.5	0.8	23	
16	Civic	1.2	1.3	15	
17	Civil rights, other	1.2	1.1	117	
18	Animal protection/rights	1.1	0.6	26	
19	Old age/senior rights	1.1	1.8	28	
20	Abortion/reproductive rights	1.1	1.0	25	
21	Christian right	0.9	0.9	36	X
22	Consumer	0.6	0.7	8	
23	Gun owners' rights	0.4	0.7	11	X

Continued

Regression Analyses

Our outcome measure is coverage counts, the number of articles in which SMOs in a movement industry were mentioned summed for each year. Of course, not all movements

appear across the entire century, and we considered a SMO industry's first appearance to be once two SMOs in it were in existence, yielding 2,495 movement-industry-year observations for the *Times*, and 2,325 for the *Post*, with its somewhat more restricted time period.

Table 1 continued

	Movement Industry	Times Percent of Coverage	Post Percent of Coverage	# of SMOs in Industry	Conservative
24	Civil rights, Hispanic	0.4	0.9	69	
25	Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender	0.4	0.3	57	
26	Aids	0.3	0.2	8	
27	Antiabortion	0.3	0.5	36	X
28	Antismoking	0.3	0.3	13	
29	Democratic party—left	0.2	0.3	5	
30	Welfare rights	0.2	0.2	13	
31	Civil rights, Native American	0.2	0.2	5	
32	Civil rights, disability	0.1	0.1	16	
33	Prison reform/prisoner's rights	0.1	0.1	10	
34	Gun control	0.1	0.1	13	

Measuring Political Reform Arguments

As for the political reform arguments, we have two measures. The first one, *partisan regimes*, appraises the argument regarding the boost to movements by the political dominance of right and left regimes. The measure scores one for when either a left-wing or right-wing dominant regime was in power. A left-wing or liberal regime is defined as having a liberal Democrat in the White House with a liberal majority in both houses of Congress. A right-wing or conservative regime is defined as having a conservative Republican in the White House and a conservative majority in both houses of Congress. A liberal Democratic president is one who scores 65 percent or higher on an averaged "social" and "economic" ideology score, and a conservative Republican president is one who scores 35 percent lower on this averaged score (Segal, Timpone and Howard 2000). A liberal or left-wing Congress is one has a majority in both Houses made up of northern Democratic and radical third-party representatives, plus 25 percent of

southern Democrats. Similarly, a conservative Congress has majorities in both houses of Republicans and right-wing third party members, plus 40 percent of southern Democrats (Poole and Rosenthal 2011). This procedure produces two periods of liberal dominance (1935 through 1938 and 1965 through 1966) and two periods of conservative dominance (1921 through 1932 and 1981 through 1982). The measure scores one for each of these periods, and we expect it to have a positive influence on the outcome measure of coverage.

A second political reform measure, enacted and *enforced policy*, upgrades a measure from Amenta et al. (2009), which scored one for each year during and after the enactment of a major policy in favor of the movement's issue or main constituency (Aberbach and Peterson 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 2011). The enforced policy measure is a time-varying ordered categorical variable ranging from zero to five and representing the comprehensiveness of major policies, including court rulings, new legislation and bureaucracies to enforce or administer a central policy law regarding the movement's constituency. To identify major legislation and legislative-like rulings, we searched monographs about the specific movements and related policies, agencies administering policies and the Policy Agendas Project. In the case of the African American civil rights movement, for instance, we examined several monographs, the websites of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and several organizations, including the NAACP, as well as the Policy Agendas Project (Baumgartner and Jones 2011). We then evaluated these identified policies in relation to one another. The consensus was the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the most important and best fit our criteria. Based on all the evaluations, this movement received a score of zero from 1900 to 1954, when *Brown v. Board of Education* was decided. It added two more points for the Civil Rights Act, one more for the Voting Rights Act, and one additional point for the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (also known as the Fair Housing Act). With the *Bakke* decision in 1978, the score was reduced to a four.² The enforced policy measure is expected to have positive effects on movement activity.

Resource Mobilization, Political Opportunity and Newspaper Practices

Many scholars have offered causal claims about the macrohistorical trajectories of social movements, SMOs and their consequences. These scholars include proponents of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977) and political opportunity theories (McAdam 1982, 1996; Tarrow 1996). Although none of the major theories of movements refers seeks explicitly to explain their newspaper coverage, as we have seen, coverage can serve as a proxy for movement presence at the movement industry level, and most major movement theories also have been applied to the consequences of social movements (Giugni 2004; Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su 2010). In addition to the movement arguments, we address news media-related arguments that apply strictly to the coverage of movements (Andrews and Caren 2010), as well as controls related to newspapers' capacities and political coverage.

The resource mobilization perspective sees the key to social movement activity in the expansion of resources available. It expects movement organizations to thrive and

diversify by way of available resources, especially those made available by “conscience constituents,” who support causes as their education and income increase, especially through foundations (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Most important of all from this perspective are the “mobilizing structures” or SMOs themselves. We first measure the *SMOs* in a given movement industry, determined by organizational birthdates. Because SMOs can be covered after their disbanding and because often they do not formally disband, we do not drop any once they have organized. Second, we examine the logged number of *foundations* in existence, using linear interpolations for 1900 to 1970 on decade counts, with yearly data afterward (Foundation Center 2011).³ Both the organizations and foundations measures are expected to have positive effects on movement activity.

Political opportunity arguments hold that variations in movement outcomes (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) will result from changes in political contexts that favor movements (Kriesi 2004), through structural changes or signaling processes. Either process is often operationalized with political partisanship (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), in which left partisanship is expected to have a positive effect on movement activity and presence and right partisanship is expected to have a negative effect. Specifically, these scholars identify cycles of movement activity in the 1930s, with labor and unemployed workers’ movements leading the way, and in the late 1950s through 1960s (Tarrow 1994:166-67; McAdam 1982), with the African American civil rights movement at the forefront, followed by antiwar activism. For political opportunity theories, we employ *Democratic White House* and *congressional ideology*, using the D-W nominate “median representative ideology” score of each Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 2011), based on roll call votes, ranging from one to minus one. The ideology score is reversed in sign, to be higher for liberal Congresses. Political opportunity models also address repressive capacities (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996), which are expected to suppress social movement activity. We measure this with a logged count of active *troop strength* in the U.S. armed forces (Dagget and Belasco 2002; Department of Defense 1997). Although troops are legally forbidden to be directly used for law enforcement through the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, they can be used passively and have been deployed during Truman’s seizing of the railroads and the steel mills in the 1950s and during the standoff at Wounded Knee in 1973. To offset the influence of war and because most wartime troops were unavailable domestically, during periods of war (1917 through 1918, 1942 through 1945, 1950 through 1953, and 1965 through 1972) troop counts are held at their prewar levels. The Democratic White House and congressional ideology measures are expected to have positive effects on movement activity; troop strength is expected to have a negative effect.

Another perspective focuses on the possible influence of news media practices on movement coverage. An SMO appears in the paper as a function of the practices of newsgathering organizations. In addition, SMO coverage may be related simply to the amount of newspaper overall coverage or political coverage. To address these possibilities, we employ a yearly count of *all articles* published and *political articles*, those mentioning either of the two major parties; each is logged. Both are expected to have positive effects.

Regression Modeling and Results

Because our dependent variables are counts, we employ negative binomial regression models. As the outcomes are likely to be a function of both our independent variables and unmeasured characteristics related to both the observation's issue and year, we adopt a strategy that focuses on the correlation between the outcomes and the within-industry and within-year variation in the independent measures. Whereas techniques for estimating these fixed-effects models are well developed in current statistical packages (e.g., `xtreg y x, fe` in Stata), no such standard estimators are available for negative binomial models (Allison 2009). We therefore employ an alternate strategy of demeaning or centering each variable by subtracting the year-specific and issue-specific means of each independent measure before entering them in regression models (Baltagi 2008:35-36). For variables that are constant within a given year, such as the total number of newspaper articles published, we subtract only the issue mean. In addition to the centered variables, we also include the year and issue specific means in our models and estimate them using a method that allows the dispersion parameter to vary between issues, to produce what Allison (2009) calls "hybrid" models.⁴ As Allison demonstrates, these models produce estimates that are almost identical to the fixed-effects estimation strategies of including issue and year indicator variables, but have the advantage of allowing issue or year invariant variables to be included in the models. This strategy also avoids difficulties in model convergence if we were to estimate the year and issue fixed effects by including them as dummy variables. As we have expected coefficient directions, we employ one-tailed significance tests.

The first tests, shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2, indicate some support for resource mobilization, political opportunity and media-related models. Models 1 and 2, for the *Times* and the *Post*, respectively, include all the measures, including the controls, except the political reform measures. Of the resource mobilization measures, the coefficient for SMOs measure is positive and significant at the .01 level for both models, whereas coefficient for the foundations measure is positive in one model, but not significant, and negative in the other. For the political opportunity model, the measure of active duty troops is significant and negative as expected in both models. However, the coefficients for congressional liberalism and Democratic president are negative in each model. Of the media-related measures, the coefficients for total articles and political articles are positive and significant in each model, as expected.

In Models 3 and 4, we add the political reform measures, partisan regime and enforced policy, to the previous models, and each measure proves positive and significant in each instance. The coefficients for partisan regimes and enforced policy are positive and significant at the .01 level in each model. In each model, the improvement to fit is significant, and none of the other coefficients change significantly. Substantively the effects are important. In the *New York Times*, the results for which run across the entire century, a partisan regime year produces an average increase from 133 to 156 articles on SMOs, a gain of approximately 17 percent; for enforced policy, a move from the lowest to highest level constitutes an increase from 105 to 166 articles, or an increase of approximately 58 percent.

A series of checks for robustness uphold these results (see Table A1). Despite the extensive representation of the labor movement in the data, rerunning the analyses without this industry does not greatly influence the results, as Models 1 and 2 of Table A1 show. All coefficients are in similar directions and show similar levels of significance. We also substitute *Democratic representation in Congress* for the D-W nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 2011), and, as Models 3 and 4 indicate, the results are similar. Next, we address a series of arguments that are difficult to operationalize. Research findings indicate the importance of grievances (Klandermans, van

Table 2: Coefficients for Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regressions of SMO Industry-Year Article Mentions on Selected Causal Measures

	(1) NY Times	(2) Wash. Post	(3) NY Times	(4) Wash. Post
Resource mobilization				
- Foundations	0.037 (0.72)	-0.0477 (-1.04)	-0.0127 (-0.28)	-0.0635 (-1.41)
- SMOs	1.753** (33.63)	1.760** (31.00)	1.763** (32.81)	1.840** (30.28)
Political opportunities				
- Democratic White House	-0.0772 (-2.72)	-0.0563 (-1.82)	-0.0503 (-1.80)	-0.0379 (-1.24)
- Congressional liberalism	-0.193 (-2.20)	-0.246 (-1.89)	-0.115 (-1.36)	-0.244 (-1.98)
- Active troop strength	-0.245** (-7.36)	-0.170** (-4.38)	-0.176** (-5.24)	-0.124** (-3.19)
Media practices				
- All articles	0.458** (8.48)	0.274** (3.68)	0.572** (9.32)	0.258** (3.52)
- Political articles	0.144** (3.62)	0.135** (4.09)	0.0949* (2.47)	0.110** (3.49)
Political reform				
- Reform regimes			0.0963** (2.66)	0.172** (4.79)
- Enforced policy			0.107** (6.74)	0.0376* (2.26)

der Toorn and van Stekelenburg 2008; Caren, Gaby and Herrold 2011) in spurring movements, and although movements have many, varied and shifting grievances, we address this minimally and globally with the *unemployment rate* (McVeigh 2006; Caren, Gaby and Herrold 2011). Studies also find that newspapers over-report collective action that is large or violent (McCarthy, McPhail and Smith 1996; Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule 2004); to address that, we provide a measure *disruptive capacities*, which scores one for any year in which any organization in the movement industry was engaged in disruptive action such as large protests, strikes, boycotts,

occupations, civil disobedience and protests with violence or drawing the violent reaction of authorities, as reported in scholarly monographs and articles (see Amenta et al. 2009).

Also, conservative movements may be influenced by different factors (McVeigh 2009) than nonconservative ones or covered less extensively by nonconservative newspapers. Although there is no consensus on what constitutes a conservative movement, which may vary over time, we examine a dummy measure for the five movement industries we have broadly labeled *conservative* (see Table 1). As Models 5 and 6 indicate, each of these measures is in the expected direction and most are significant. However, the political reform measures remain significant at the .05 level or better.⁵ Finally, we address the extent to which the impact of enforced policies may decay over-time, including a measure of the log of the *time since last policy gain*; movement-years without enforced policies score zero. As shown in Models 7 and 8, the coefficients for this term are significant and negative, while the coefficients for the enforced policy term become larger. This is consistent with the impact

Constant	-37.30** (-3.55)	202.9** (5.48)	-22.22 (-1.42)	172.4** (3.47)
ln_r				
Constant	-0.0430 (-0.20)	0.0487 (0.22)	0.00859 (0.04)	0.0951 (0.43)
ln_s				
Constant	2.599** (9.18)	2.686** (9.41)	2.639** (9.37)	2.728** (9.51)
d2_ln_corrections				
Observations	2495	2325	2495	2325
lrtest chi2			171.1	139.0
lrtest df			5	5
lrtest p value			4.28e-35	2.91e-28

Note: See text for description of measures. One-tailed tests.
+ $p < .1$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

of policy changes being strongest when they are first being implemented and declining to some extent over time.

Thus, the results support the political reform perspective as well as bolstering some of the other theoretical perspectives. The resource mobilization argument is supported by the positive influence of the SMOs measure. The political opportunity perspective is supported by negative influence of troop strength. As for newspaper practices, SMO coverage is related to both overall coverage and political party coverage. There is some evidence that coverage is less for conservative movements and greater for disruptive ones, though better measures are needed. These findings add credence to our claim that variance in coverage unexplained strictly by media influences tap movement activity. However, despite all these influences, the political reform model gains considerable support. Both the partisan regime measure, which diverges from the expectations of standard political opportunity models, and the enforced policy measure, an aspect of political context not typically addressed by scholars of social movements, are keys influence on the outcome measures, despite all controls. All in all, the extension of the historical and political institutionalist approach to explaining the prominence of movements and advocacy groups helps to explain SMO industry newspaper coverage.

Analyses of Patterns of Coverage


Next, we compare some of the expectations of the political reform model with those of standard political opportunity theory and analyze more detailed patterns of coverage across three empirical situations. First, we examine overall patterns of coverage, identifying and comparing the waves of coverage over the twentieth century. Second, we examine the coverage of the African American civil rights movement, which was at the center of the 1960s wave of coverage and movement activity. Third, we examine coverage during the right-wing regime of the early 1980s. The models have different empirical expectations, and in each instance the evidence favors the political reform model.

We first examine the overall waves of movement coverage. Figure 1 provides the first big comparative picture of any outcome of U.S. SMOs over a long period of time, showing the historical profile of SMO coverage in the *Times*, which ranges across the twentieth century. (See Figure 1.) We employ a 3-year moving average to smooth out year-to-year spikes in coverage, and juxtapose it to a hypothetical curve of 30-year cycles. The big picture is in many ways congruent with the political opportunity model. There are identifiable coverage waves, one peaking in the 1930s and another around 30 years later, with the 1930s wave centered on labor, and the 1960s wave on African American civil rights SMOs. However, there is no big rise in coverage before the 1930s, despite women's suffrage and Prohibition movements in the 1910s, and no major wave in coverage after the 1970s; the pattern is of irregular waves, not smooth recurrent cycles (see also Koopmans 2005). Moreover, the initial wave of coverage peaked in the late 1930s, later than expected, and lasted longer, taking a hiatus for World War II, before ending in the early 1950s. Also, the 1960s wave peaked in the early 1970s, later than suggested by political opportunity theorists. Finally, there was a small wave

of coverage in the early 1980s, smaller and briefer than that of the 1960s, but no additional wave of coverage in 1990s.


The political reform perspective helps to explain these anomalies in the overall trajectories of coverage. First, the lack of coverage during the Progressive Era, a time when parties were first declining and before the polity had become nationalized, is attributable to the fact that the preconditions for the rise of SMOs were only emerging. The political reform perspective also helps to explain the fact that coverage wave of the 1930s was more sustained than the 1960s wave. The earlier period of left-wing partisan

Figure 1. New York Times SMO Coverage, Labor and African American Civil Rights Movement Coverage in the Times and Hypothetical 30-Year Waves, 1900-1999




dominance was longer; by contrast, the 1960s regime lasted only two years. Moreover, the small wave of coverage in the early 1980s came under a right-wing regime, which aligns with political reform expectations. By contrast, the standard political opportunity model would expect there to be no wave of coverage. The political reform perspective also helps to explain the big dog that failed to bark – the nonexistent third wave of SMO coverage that presumably should have appeared in the 1990s. There was no political formation in the 1990s analogous to the Democratic dominance of the

Figure 2. New York Times Coverage of African American Civil Rights SMOs, a Hypothetical Curve and Key Policies relating to African American Civil Rights, 1935-1999



1930s and 1960s. The Bill Clinton administration was unaccompanied by Democratic supermajorities and instead faced Republican House majorities after 1994 and was not greatly productive of policy reform.

The political reform and the standard political opportunity models also have somewhat different expectations for the coverage trajectory of the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982). According to political opportunity argument, the movement should rise from an extremely low level of presence in the late 1940s, peak



in approximately 1964, the year the Civil Rights Act was passed, and then decline afterward in a cyclical pattern, as modeled in Figure 2. The political reform model expects the movement to be aided by the partisan regime in power, from 1965 to 1966, and to be bolstered against decline by legislation in favor of the group, notably the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts, but also the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and legislative-like Supreme Court rulings, notably *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), which expanded civil rights, and *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* (1978), which upheld but constrained affirmative action. Measured by a 3-year moving average, coverage peaks during the partisan regime period, yet remains high in the immediate aftermath of the new legislation. Coverage declines from the peak and further after the Bakke decision, but never returns to the level of the late 1940s. Much coverage appears to the right of or outside of the hypothesized wave. In the period from 1935-1949, just before the coverage wave, the total amount of coverage comprised 1,423 articles, or about 95 per year; in the period after end of the wave until the end of the century, coverage was about four times as high, 6,234 articles, or about 390 per year. In short, the movement received a long-term boost from policy-making activity.

The political reform model's expectations for periods of right-wing rule also are borne out by an examination of the right-wing regime of the 1980 and the coverage patterns attending it. The model expects minor gains for right-wing SMO industries and further activity among nonright SMOs whose constituents' policies were being rolled back or suffered unfavorable administrative rulings. The right-wing rule during the early years of the Ronald Reagan administration in the early 1980s led to an expected minor wave of SMO coverage, as Figure 3 shows. (We use an average of the *Times* and *Post* coverage scores in the figure.) During the period when the right dominated under the Reagan administration, new government initiatives were few, however, and thus provided only minor long-term support to right-wing SMOs, and not the major legislative and bureaucratic growth of the earlier left-wing regime and SMO response. But in its bids at retrenchment, however, this regime provoked left-wing resistance and coverage. Figure 3 breaks down the 1980s wave of coverage between conservative SMOs and all others. Although the coverage of conservative SMOs shows an increase, as does the percentage of SMO coverage that is conservative in the early 1980s, nonconservative coverage also rises in response. Thus unlike the expectations of standard political opportunity models and in consonance with the political reform model, right-wing rule spurs movements, right and nonright.

Discussion and Conclusions

Our analyses of approximately 600,000 *New York Times* and *Washington Post* articles citing 1,440 SMOs across 34 movement industries show that our political reform model helps greatly to explain SMO coverage – a measure closely correlated with movement presence at the industry level. In addition, our controls for the influence of newspaper practices on coverage (Earl et al. 2004; Andrews and Caren 2010),

including measures involving newspapers' overall coverage and political coverage, lend support to our claims that what remains is movement presence and activity. Newspaper coverage stands as the only plausible movement outcome measure available across many movements and over long stretches of time, in contrast to counts of protest events, which are subject to selection biases and have been used most beneficially as explanatory measures (Earl et al. 2004). In regression analyses controlling for other movement factors and newspaper characteristics, the existence of enforced policies supporting the constituents of an SMO and the appearance of partisan regimes were consistently influential in explaining the coverage of all SMO industries across the century, lending support to the political reform arguments and extending the reach of political and historical institutionalist approaches. The regression analyses also provide some support for the other main perspectives, including some aspects of the resource mobilization and political opportunity models and media-related accounts.

An analysis of patterns of coverage provides further support for the political reform arguments. The pattern of coverage across the century fits political reform ideas, with no waves of coverage during the Progressive Era or the 1990s, as compared with the two brief periods in the middle 1930s and 1960s during a left partisan regime that was productive of major policy changes, and a small wave of coverage in the early 1980s, when there was a conservative regime. The movements gaining in legislation also received long-term boosts from policy changes, and their coverage never declined to their lower levels from before the reforms, as shown in an analysis of the civil rights movement. Nonetheless, the support for the political reform argument needs to be placed in context with findings regarding other influences on social movements. Some aspects of both the resource mobilization and standard political opportunity models help to explain movement activity and coverage. The political reform model adds macrosociological explanations regarding when major upsurges in movement activity and presence are likely to occur and which movements and issues will be benefited in the long run.

Several other questions and issues remain for the future. One area of needed research is to apply the political reform model to additional time periods and places, such as before the 1900s, into the twenty-first century, and across advanced democracies. Comparatively, the model probably applies better to a country according to the degree to which a small number of catchall parties dominate the party system, as in the U.S. case. In systems with two or only a few viable parties, most of the interests represented by SMOs do not take party form, and catchall parties are more likely to seek to promote movement and advocacy organizations. In this way, the United States is an extreme case with its two dominant catchall parties and the late centralization of its polity – factors that also figure into its slow and uneven establishment of public social provision (Amenta 1998; Lipset and Marks 2000). In the twenty-first century, U.S. politics have become more simplified with the increased democratization and polarization of the polity. Our expectation would be an increase in movement presence and coverage during the conservative regime of George W. Bush, 2003 to 2007 and the left regime of Barack Obama, from 2009 to 2011 and changes in policy during these periods.

The political reform argument also has implications for different groups of movement industries, and further research needs to appraise these in the contexts of alternatives. For instance, the political reform argument has implications for arguments about new social movements (Berry 1999). Notably, the political reform model would not expect “old” social movements to decline, if policy legacies remain to promote these SMO industries, and would expect the persistence of movement industries such as those focused on labor and veterans, but not antialcohol, whose main supportive policies were repealed with Prohibition. Similarly, the political reform argument may not well explain conservative movements, as they are somewhat less likely to achieve such policy legacies (McVeigh 2009). In addition, analyses of individual movements will make it possible to address some specific conditions, such as grievances and hardships, which were difficult to model in an analysis of all movements.

Another key task is to address further the role of newspapers in the coverage of SMOs, both as sites of cultural production and nodes of political power (Gamson 2004). Specifying interactive influences between political contexts, organizations, strategies and changes in the structure and practices of newsgathering will be needed to explain fully the coverage of SMOs. Finally, theories regarding the new advantages that movements gain through politics often see attention by the mass media as a necessary step (Amenta et al. 2010). With these data and the comparative approach to movements, it will be possible to appraise these arguments by examining the impact of all coverage related to SMOs, rather than simply coverage of protest.

Notes

1. An article mention is an individual article in which an SMO is referred to. If an SMO is named several times within one article, it counts as only one article mention. The year 1994 is the final one for which there is coverage of the *Post* through ProQuest. Although we attempted searches through Lexis-Nexis, its search engines inflate and distort the counts of article mentions.
2. This five-point measure correlates .87 with the previous dummy measure, and detailed explanations for scores are available for each issue family.
3. The Foundation Center surveyed 21,506 grant-making foundations in 2005 and report the number of foundations established in each decade prior to 1970 and for each year after that. Our foundation measure captures the cumulative total number of foundations existing in each time period, although small foundations and foundations that failed prior to 2005 are excluded from the total.
4. Our final model in pseudo Stata code is as follows: $\text{xtnbreg } y \text{ } dm_x \text{ } i_x \text{ } y_x, re -$ where y_x is the year-mean of x and dm_x is the x minus the year and industry means. For example, the coefficient for organizations is the effect of organizations, controlling for the industry's average level of organizations and the year's average level of organizations. We do not report the coefficients for these mean measures (see Allison 2009:67), though they are available upon request.
5. We also *double-counted front-page articles* (Vliegenthart, Oegema and Klandermans 2005), but the results (not shown) turn out similarly.

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Appendix: How SMOs Are Defined

We locate our definition of SMOs at the center of the literature on social movements. To conceptualize SMOs, we rely on standard definitions (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson 1990). For McCarthy and Zald (1977), SMOs are formal organizations whose goals are allied with those of a social movement and attempts to implement those goals (see also Gamson 1990; Berry 1999). We include only *politically* inflected organizations, those with political goals and seek social change through politics, including "advocacy organizations" (Andrews and Edwards 2004), public-interest groups (PIGs) (Knoke and Zhu 2012) and "citizens" organizations (Berry 1999). We include organizations engaged in politics making claims for a constituency group that is not elite-based or seek to promote issues of general public concern, expecting that an SMO's potential influence over political outcomes would rely on mobilizing constituencies to gain the attention of national political and state actors. SMOs are voluntary

and nonprofit organizations, thus ruling out all corporations and government agencies, but do not necessarily have to have filed for a specific tax status (as these have changed across the century). Following Gamson (1990), we include only national organizations and labor unions (more on which below). We also include what McCarthy and Zald (1977) call an “established SMO,” one that has won new benefits or achieved some degree of acceptance.

Our definition is designed to include all organizations that mainly fit the categorization and exclude those that mainly do not (Ragin 2000). There is no tactical qualification for inclusion. We thus include organizations that used largely or exclusively “insider” or “institutional” tactics, such as the “advocacy” groups enumerated by the Encyclopedia of Associations. We also include the organizations that used or threatened disruptive tactics (McAdam 1982). However, we exclude violent organizations making broad political claims but without any significant constituencies (more below). Voluntary, nonprofit organizations that did not fit are ruled out for two main reasons: that they were not politically oriented or they were neither public-interested nor seeking to represent everyday citizens. Two other sorts of political, voluntary, nonprofit organizations also fall outside the definition: the two major political parties and SMOs not nationally focused.

A. Citizens' Voluntary Organizations not Mainly Political

All voluntary nonprofit organizations not mainly focused on political contention or issues are ruled out. *Recreational* organizations, including large ones such as the American Bowling Congress or American Softball Association, are not included. However, the National Rifle Association is included because of its political focus on maintaining gun owner's rights and opposing gun control legislation. (Nonetheless, articles involving shooting contests are excluded, as were all articles regarding American Legion baseball, etc.) All mainly *service* organizations are also ruled out, and thus we do not include groups such as Doctors Without Borders or the Kiwanis, Lions, and Optimists Clubs. We do not include *utopian religious groups and cults* such as the ill-fated Peoples' Temple. Also ruled out are *religious fellowship* organizations, such as the Knights of Columbus. However, the explicitly political Moral Majority and Christian Coalition are counted, as being central to the citizens' groups of the Christian Right, as was the American Friends Service Committee. Similarly, not fitting the definition are all *fraternal* organizations, along with women's auxiliaries and sororities. Thus, we do not include Elks, Masons, Eagles, and their ilk, even though the Eagles concerned themselves in part with old age pensions in the 1920s. Despite many resemblances in ritual and form to fraternal organizations, veterans' organizations from the Grand Army of the Republic to the American Legion are included because of their political focus. Thus many of the largest civic organizations in U.S. history (Skocpol 2003) are not counted because their political orientation was only secondary to other missions.

B. Political Organizations that Are not SMOs

Some national organizations mainly concerned with political issues were not included. Notably, we excluded the main political parties, as the way they attempt to influence politics is different from the standard SMO. The main parties seek to influence politics by running slates of candidates for office and to win elections. Thus, the Democrats and Republicans are excluded, along with moderate catchall parties seeking power, such as various “Independent” parties or the Reform party of 1992. However, parties seeking to promote an issue more so than to place candidates into office are counted (e.g., the Green party or the Prohibition party).

We also exclude a series of elite-based organizations. We also excluded *nonpublic interest groups* that represented elite or professional constituencies and business organizations, self-interested organizations without seeking citizen support. This category accounts for the bulk of politically oriented organizations (Knoke and Zhu 2012), but they have been typically viewed as different in goals and constituencies from so-called public interest groups (PIGs). Indeed, scholars often assess the bias of the interest-group configuration in any polity by way of its balance between PIGs and the standard sort of “interest group” (Greenwood 2003), which is typically devoted to the economic interests of its members. There is simply no research among social movement scholars that considers these organizations to be SMOs. And so the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, along with every trade association, major and minor, are categorized as outside. Similarly, every *professional organization*, no matter how involved in politics, from the heavily engaged American Medical Association and the American Bar Association to the much more lightly engaged American Sociological Association and American Political Science Association, is excluded. Again, no scholarship has ever treated these organizations as approximating SMOs. However, groups organized by business leaders hoping to gain mass appeal, such as the American Liberty League, are included. Similarly, groups of professional elites seeking to represent everyday people or designed to pursue a public interest, like Physicians for Social Responsibility or the National Lawyers Guild, are included. Other noncitizens organizations are also excluded. Notably, we exclude *foundations*, whether they see themselves as working in the public interest, such as the Russell Sage or Ford Foundations, or explicitly right-wing foundations like the Olin Foundation, as well as *think tanks*.

There were two other categories of organizations that are also not included. The first were SMOs not nationally focused. For instance, most organizations appearing in the Dynamics of Collective Action data set (see Earl et al. 2004) are locally focused. However, we did include local or state chapters of national organizations. For instance, Planned Parenthood of New York is counted as part of Planned Parenthood. Finally, there are organizations that saw themselves as SMOs but whose membership base was highly exclusive and whose claims to being public-interested or broadly constituency based were attenuated by their reliance on violence and crime. Such violent vanguard organizations as the Symbionese Liberation Army, Weather Underground and Black Liberation Army are not counted and are viewed as being closer to criminal

organizations or bands of outlaws. However, the simple use of violent tactics does not rule out an organization, as we include the mass-based Ku Klux Klan and other groups with mass support that advocated violence or self-defense such as the Black Panther Party.

C. On Labor

Following Gamson (1990), we counted all peak labor associations as well as national unions. This is a close call as some may see labor as self-interested and trade-oriented, and given labor's reliance on strikes it was excluded from the Dynamics of Collective Action project. But the labor movement is mass-based and has typically had public-interested political goals (Skocpol 2003). Thus, the American Federation of Labor, the International Workers of the World, the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the AFL-CIO are all counted. Also counted, however, are the national unions (Gamson 1990). Labor accounted for many of the most covered SMOs, as well as for the plurality of coverage among SMO industries. However, given the intermediate nature of the labor movement and its extensive coverage, we also analyze the data without it. As indicated in Table A1, the regression results do not depend on the inclusion of this industry.

Table A1: Coefficients for Fixed Effects Negative Binomial Regressions of SMO Industry-Year Article Mentions on Selected Causal Measures

	(1) NY Times	(2) Wash. Post	(3) NY Times	(4) Wash. Post	(5) NY Times	(6) Wash. Post	(7) NY Times	(8) Wash. Post
Resource mobilization								
- Foundations	-0.000806 (-0.02)	-0.0826* (-1.65)	-0.0252 (-0.56)	-0.0653* (-1.45)	-0.0452 (-0.92)	-0.0248 (-0.48)	-0.0304 (-0.63)	-0.103* (-2.17)
- SMOs	1.764** (31.51)	1.885** (29.40)	1.762** (32.53)	1.813** (29.88)	1.643** (29.81)	1.670** (26.75)	1.734** (31.92)	1.835** (30.46)
Political opportunities								
- Democratic White House	-0.0654* (-2.22)	-0.0467* (-1.44)	-0.0455* (-1.56)	-0.0255 (-0.75)	-0.0499 (-1.61)	0.00185 (0.05)	-0.043* (-1.47)	-0.0133 (-0.42)
- Congressional liberalism	-0.116 (-1.30)	-0.184 (-1.39)	0.0473 (0.30)	0.105 (0.47)	-0.0192 (-0.18)	-0.0818 (-0.57)	-0.145* (-1.63)	-0.206* (-1.66)
- Active troop strength	-0.214** (-5.97)	-0.147** (-3.53)	-0.165** (-4.93)	-0.131** (-3.38)	-0.108** (-2.75)	-0.0532 (-1.23)	-0.134** (-3.19)	-0.0559 (-1.24)
Media practices								
- All articles	0.514** (7.72)	0.273** (3.51)	0.584** (9.21)	0.264** (3.27)	0.538** (7.43)	0.291** (3.37)	0.600** (9.14)	0.346** (4.41)
- Political articles	0.113** (2.77)	0.129** (3.83)	0.0908** (2.36)	0.120** (3.79)	0.0796* (2.08)	0.101** (3.13)	0.0881* (2.29)	0.0900** (2.87)
Political reform								
- Partisan regimes	0.132** (3.52)	0.193** (5.14)	0.0959** (2.64)	0.169** (4.65)	0.0664* (1.79)	0.148** (3.67)	0.0986** (2.69)	0.184** (5.18)
- Enforced policy	0.100** (6.07)	0.0328* (1.89)	0.109** (6.97)	0.0492** (2.98)	0.119** (7.38)	0.0398* (2.32)	0.124** (7.52)	0.0552** (3.26)
Robustness checks								
- Conservative					-0.299** (-3.01)	-0.470** (-4.67)		
- Disruptive capacities					0.438** (8.87)	0.446** (8.05)		

Continued

Table A1 continued

	(1) NY Times	(2) Wash. Post	(3) NY Times	(4) Wash. Post	(5) NY Times	(6) Wash. Post	(7) NY Times	(8) Wash. Post
- Unemployment					0.00897* (1.90)	0.00731 (1.42)		
- Time since last policy gain (ln)							-0.0692** (-4.37)	-0.0475** (-2.88)
Constant	-26.49* (-1.69)	166.4** (3.30)	-56.30** (-3.43)	-15.29 (-0.42)	-34.57* (-1.84)	145.6** (2.93)	-29.7* (-1.86)	140.7** (2.80)
ln_r								
Constant	0.0590 (0.26)	0.136 (0.60)	0.0350 (0.16)	0.163 (0.72)	-0.0232 (-0.11)	0.0870 (0.39)	-0.00746 (-0.03)	0.0637 (0.29)
ln_s								
Constant	2.650** (9.32)	2.738** (9.44)	2.681** (9.54)	2.860** (10.03)	2.532** (8.92)	2.672** (9.30)	2.602** (9.22)	2.661** (9.31)
Observations	2395	2230	2495	2325	2495	2325	2495	2325
LR Test chi2	141.9	125.0	178.4	141.8	160.4	76.90	197.7	185.20
LR Test df	5	5	5	5	5	5	8	8
LR Test p value	7.17e-29	2.69e-25	1.15e-36	7.25e-29	8.13e-33	3.73e-15	1.98e-38	8.44e-36

Note: See text for description of measures. One-tailed tests.

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$