The Political Institutions, Processes, and Outcomes Movements Seek to Influence

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Introduction

People participate in social movements and scholars study them at least in part because they think movements may effect social and political change, by influencing institutions like states, economies, families, universities, or religious organizations. Many movements seek to influence political institutions, processes, and outcomes – which is our subject here – but political institutions, like the others, are external to movements and shape movements in many important ways (Amenta 2014; Snow and Soule 2010). Unlike some chapters in this volume, movement mobilization, strategies, and action are potential causal forces in this one, rather than phenomena to be explained. However, because movements typically represent those lacking in power, they are not likely to be dominant causal forces. This is especially true in contexts in which very powerful actors are contending, as is usually the case with states and politics.

Prominent scholars such as Skocpol (2003) and Giugni (2009) argue that movements do not typically matter much in politics. In the extensive literatures on democratization, bureaucratization, political parties, elections, court decision-making, and legislative processes and public policy-making, movements receive limited consideration. And although some scholars, including Gilens and Page (2014) and Hacker and Pierson (2010), argue that organizations matter in US political decision-making, they highlight business-oriented ones, not public-interested advocacy organizations or social movement ones. Also, historically the largest and most influential US movement, the labor movement, has been routed, is on the run elsewhere, and has not been replaced by anything comparable (Sano and Williamson 2008).
All the same, other scholars, such as Piven (2006) and Baumgartner and Mahoney (2005), argue that movements and related advocacy organizations have mattered quite a bit in politics. Specific movements have been found to be highly influential in some important political processes and policy outcomes (review in Amenta et al. 2010), and provided a necessary motive force behind crucial policy advances as varied as Social Security and civil rights. The case for strong movement influence is aided by the finding that policies and other political changes once enacted are often self-perpetuating, and so even a short-term influence by movements may have a long-run effect (Pierson 2000). In some countries, moreover, labor movements created political parties, took political power, and enacted policies in favor of their constituents (e.g. Huber and Stephens 2001). Even in the United States, where no labor or socialist party ever formed, the labor movement became a key player in the Democratic Party (Amenta 1998; Schickler 2016; Schlozman 2015).

The literature on the political influence of movements has grown tremendously since the previous edition of this handbook (Amenta et al. 2010; Uba 2009). In this chapter, we review key arguments and findings, highlight promising new developments, and connect scholarship on movement influence over political institutions, processes, and outcomes with the academic literatures surrounding them. We limit our attention to movements and politics in democracies and partial democracies, bypassing revolutions and protest in autocracies (but see Chapter 38 by Chen and Moss, and Chapter 39 by Goldstone and Ritter, in this volume) – partly because most of the research is on democracies, but mainly because the determinants of movement influence likely differ between democracies and autocracies. Also, although movements target many other institutions than political ones, our focus here is on movements that target states. We first examine what it means for movements to be influential in politics, including such processes and outcomes as democratization, elections, public opinion, and policy-making and in venues such as legislative bodies, political parties, administrative bureaucracies, and courts. We then discuss where scholarship has advanced. From there we review theoretical pathways to influence for challengers. We conclude with a suggested agenda for research that seeks greater connection between the literatures on social movements and on political institutions.

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We focus on all movements that are politically oriented in some fashion. We define such movements as actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through states and governments by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action (Amenta and Young 1999; Amenta et al. 2010). The definition focuses on McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) social movement organizations and related advocacy organizations (Andrews and Edwards 2004) that can be combined into movements or movement families. We include all the political collective action of movements, both extra-institutional action and institutional action, like lobbying, lawsuits, and press conferences. Our definition excludes “interest groups” based on businesses and professionals, such as the Chamber of
Commerce and the American Medical Association, whose constituents are not facing political power deficits and are seen as members of the polity (Amenta and Young 1999; Hojnacki et al. 2012).

In initial discussions of the political influence of movements, scholars focused broadly on “concessions,” “success” and “failure,” and “collective benefits.” Concessions, as discussed by Lipsky (1968) and Piven and Cloward (1977), include anything granted by a target to a challenger. In Gamson’s formulation, success involves whether targets provided “new advantages” to organized challengers by acting on their goals or by “accepting” them as legitimate, with failure meaning not achieving new advantages or acceptance (Gamson 1990). As advanced by Amenta and Young (1999), collective benefits are group-wise advantages or disadvantages for movement constituencies from which non-participants cannot easily be excluded. Although most of the demands of movement actors include such collective benefits, the collective benefit standard takes into account that a challenger can have considerable impact even when it fails to achieve its goals, that successful challengers could have negligible consequences, and that their actions might cause “collective bads” (Agnone 2007; Amenta and Young 1999; Andrews 2004), such as repression (Piven and Cloward 1977), electoral losses (McAdam and Kloos 2014), or policy setbacks (Pierson 2000). In addition, there are many political outcomes that are relevant to movements’ goals and constituents, but to which movement actors have paid little attention, given their limited power and resources.

These definitions are valuable for analyzing the influence of movements in politics, but are best applied in confronting the specific features and standard determinants of the institutions they seek to change. That means removing movements from the center of analysis, as McAdam and Boudet (2012) have recently suggested, and focusing on three basic possibilities for movement influence identified by Giugni (2009): (1) movements can influence the main determinants of political institutions and outcomes; (2) movements change the relationship between these determinants and both political institutions and outcomes; or (3) movements provide separate pathways to influence over these institutions and outcomes. To take the example of policy change: Movements might influence public opinion in favor of policy changes or influence elections, each of which in turn might effect a change in policy. Alternatively, movement action may influence the positive relationship between partisan governments and policy enactments, by moving an issue higher on the political agenda. Finally, movements might bypass standard institutional actors, for instance, by way of initiatives or referendums and enact laws, or simply induce political actors to grant concessions due to protest. Included among the political institutions, processes, and outcomes of interest to movements are democratization, political parties, elections and candidates, legislative processes and policy, courts, and bureaucracies. None of these should be called the political consequences or outcomes of movements, given that there are so many other causal influences on them, but are important aspects of politics that movements often target and may influence.

The greatest potential political influences for movements are at the structural or system level and center on democratization (Amenta et al. 2010), which provides challengers continuous leverage over political processes and increases the political returns to their collective action, as Tilly indicated (1999). It is no surprise that the
right to vote has been sought by workers, women, African Americans, and others denied it (Andrews 1997; Banaszak 1996; McAdam 1982; McCammon et al. 2001; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Even once a polity is democratized, these struggles typically continue, as, for instance, in the United States, with battles over felon disfranchisement (Manza and Uggen 2008). However, some important systemic features of democratic polities are less susceptible to change and are rarely targeted, including whether the system is presidential or parliamentarian and its division of authority across functions or territories. Notably, polities with many “veto points” (Immergut 2010) provide difficult terrain for movements and others seeking political change.

Another structural transformation that can provide enduring influence is for a movement to create its own political party, as Goldstone (2003) and Schwartz (2006) among others have argued. For example, labor, green, new left, and anti-immigration parties have appeared in democratic polities (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995), though in the US polity there have been no permanent movement parties. A movement can also establish an alliance to a catchall party, such as those between the US labor, civil rights, feminist, and abortion rights movements and the Democratic Party or the Christian right, anti-abortion, anti-tax, and the gun rights movements and the Republican Party (Amenta 1998; Fetner 2008; Halfmann 2011; Schickler 2016; Schlozman 2015). Movements can also influence party programs and platforms (Schickler 2016), though not all parties are as susceptible to such influence as US parties (Halfmann 2011). Because policies are typically made by elected officials, or by courts or government bureaucrats, movements also frequently attempt to intervene in elections (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Movement actors who do not ally with parties may also target individual candidates according to their voting records or campaign promises (Amenta 2006; McVeigh 2009).

These structural and electoral circumstances in turn influence policy-making, which is at the center of politics, of key interest to social movement actors, and the subject of most studies of the political influence of movements (Amenta et al. 2010; Uba 2009). Policies are authoritative lines of action in which states provide goods, protections, and freedoms recurrently to specified groups in a routine fashion to all those meeting specified requirements (Htun and Weldon 2012; Skocpol and Amenta 1986). Such policies then can also regulate and legitimate social actors. Policies can include everything from symbolic gestures to more fundamental changes, such as the right to marry whom one chooses or not to be discriminated against in the workplace and the extensive benefits in programs like Social Security or Medicare. Through policy, states can also ratify or attempt to undermine identity claims (Amenta and Young 1999), ranging from gaining more respectful labels in governmental representations to defining racial categories.

A movement’s influence over policy may happen in the short run, but can have long-term consequences, because policies can become self-perpetuating by way of positive feedback effects (Pierson 2000). Moreover, movements and other actors seeking to prevent the adoption of new policies, such as NIMBY movements, have an easier task than those seeking positive changes. Regulatory bureaucracies may make policy decisions without new legislation, and they often also propose legislation (Amenta 1998; Skrentny 2006), and so movement actors can gain influence by staffing or influencing these agencies (Banaszak 2010). In some divided polities, like
the US polity, courts can both make and veto policy, and so movement actors can engage in litigation to uphold or overturn laws, as in abortion rights (Halfmann 2011) or in recent marriage equality battles (see also Chapter 17 by Boutcher and McCammon, in this volume).

However, most policy-making happens through legislative processes, which can be divided into parts, including agenda-setting, legislative content, passage, and implementation (Amenta and Young 1999; Andrews and Edwards 2004) and movements have sought to influence each. Much scholarship has shown that protest is most influential at earlier stages such as agenda-setting (Andrews 2001; Johnson 2008; King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; Olzak and Soule 2009; Soule and King 2006). But movement actors can work to make the content of legislation more favorable (Amenta 2006; Bernstein 2001), influence individual legislators to vote for it (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Heaney and Rojas 2015), and help to secure its implementation (Andrews and Edwards 2004). We assess research on movement influence on these different institutions and processes below.

**Under Which Conditions Do Movements Matter in Politics?**

It is not possible to answer whether movements have been highly or mainly influential in politics. That would require an examination of all political outcomes of importance to movements, arraying them in a priority order, and then assessing movement influence over them – an impossible task. The literature on the political consequences of movements, extensive as it is, has been far more modest. It has focused on case studies of the influence of prominent individual movements or organizations on specific policies and policy processes, typically involving the US case. Scholars have generally found movements to be influential in such research, but selection issues make it difficult to generalize. These studies are typically of larger movements, often at their peak of mobilization, focusing on issues they are explicitly contesting (Amenta et al. 2010; Uba 2009). However, there are many relevant political issues and outcomes for which there is mobilization but little political change or simply little mobilization at all (Burstein and Sausner 2005). In addition, journals rarely publish studies about the influence of movements if they show no influence. In perhaps most studies of democratization, political party formation, and policy-making, scholars do not address movements at all or only in a minor way.

The initial question that scholars studying the political consequences of movements must consider is whether movements matter and the forms and strategies of movement actors that might increase the likelihood of influence. The earliest debates in the field considered whether movements were influential at all and whether organization (Gamson 1990) or disruption (Piven and Cloward 1977) was more likely to yield results. Since then scholars have developed stronger explanations by engaging alternative theoretical perspectives that account for the broader range of actors and influences on politics. Moreover, scholars have paid increasing attention to the specific conditions under which movements matter and the interactions between movements, various other interested actors, the characteristics of targets and political institutions, and the contexts in which they engage (Amenta et al. 2010; Uba 2009).
Organization, protest, collective action and strategy

We begin by considering movement forms and strategies that may improve the chances of movements being influential. The main factors hypothesized to increase the likelihood of impact are the amount and forms of mobilization and the various strategies movements may employ. The best work in this tradition has specified the theoretical mechanisms by which movements can matter, engaged relevant alternative explanations, and considered the conditions under which movements are more or less consequential.

Many scholars point to formal organization as critical for providing movement’s leverage in politics. The most typical theoretical argument is that formal organization facilitates political influence by concentrating resources, institutionalizing movement claims, and participating in routine bargaining processes. Thus, as Andrews argues, access and negotiation are two of the critical mechanisms of movement influence in politics (Andrews 2001; Andrews and Edwards 2004). For example, some movement organizations come to occupy prominent positions in the interest group sector, form or become central to political parties, or participate in broader political coalitions. Many studies point to the significance of movement organizations. Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy (2010) show that the growth of environmental movement organizations increased the number of Congressional hearings from 1961 to 1990. Best’s (2012) study of advocacy on behalf of disease and medical research shows that advocates secured greater federal funds on behalf of their cause and had a systemic effect by shifting the criteria from scientific ones to those linked to advocates’ criteria of worthiness (e.g. dollars per death). Most often, scholars have measured movement organization in terms of organizational resources (e.g. members, funds) or organizational density.

Scholars also focus on collective action, especially protest, as a potential source of influence, with disruption as the main mechanism of movement influence (Piven and Cloward 1977). For example, Luders (2010) indicates ways that civil rights activists sought to impose disruption costs on targets. Andrews and Gaby (2015) find that federal attention to civil rights protest was concerned primarily with disruption. Santoro (2002, 2008) shows a positive impact of black protest on the comprehensiveness of fair employment and voting rights policy. However, Olzak and Soule (2009) find that environmental protest had little impact on congressional attention, although the number of environmental organizations did. Movement protest and activity may matter for reasons beyond disruption. Much protest is not very disruptive and focuses on signaling a broad base of support for a set of claims. The political significance of this kind of collective action may depend on its ability to capture public attention, make persuasive claims, and facilitate organization building. For example, Madestam et al. (2013) show that Tea Party protests spurred local organization building and support for Tea Party candidates in congressional elections.

Some scholars focus on routes to influence through activists holding elected office or as state bureaucrats. For example, Santoro and McGuire (1997) show that “institutional activists” – state officials who are part of a broader social movement – were critical to the passage of US state-level comparable worth policies. Similarly, Böhm (2015) examines the German antinuclear movement showing that activists were able
to influence the closing of nuclear power plants by electoral successes at the regional and federal level. Banaszak (2010) traces the ways that feminists inside federal agencies played a critical role in institutionalizing and extending the gains of second-wave feminism by working “inside” the state and lending support to advocacy “outside” the state as well.

These debates are connected to larger questions about the influence of movement strategy (Ganz 2000; Jasper 2004). Because movements operate in complex and changing contexts, some scholars argue that greater attention should be paid to movement leadership and the conditions under which leaders are better able to develop effective strategies (Andrews et al. 2010; Ganz 2000; McCammon 2012). Instead of the amount of organizational resources or the number of protest events, work in this tradition focuses more closely on why some movements are able to devise strategies that are appropriate for particular targets or political settings. Strategy may be enhanced by greater diversity at the movement level with organizations that can deploy multiple tactics (Andrews 2004; Olzak and Ryo 2007). Ganz (2000) argues that organizations with more diverse leaders and deliberative leadership practices may outperform more established organizations. Similarly, McCammon (2012) argues that women’s jury rights movements that adapted to political circumstances (including setbacks) secured political victories earlier. Along these lines, scholars have also considered the influence of framing strategies. In their study of 15 homeless social movement organizations, Cress and Snow (2000) point to resonant diagnostic and prognostic frames as critical for multiple outcomes. McCammon (2009) argues that women’s jury activists were better able to persuade legislators with frames that emphasized the breadth of the problem, provided a rationale for supporting the movement, and offered credible evidence to support the frame.

**Political contexts and political mediation**

Other scholars focus on the causal importance of the political contexts in which movements engage. The earliest such claims hold that, once movements were mobilized, their influence depended on a favorable political context, notably “open” states with “strong” administrative capacities (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). But within any country, movement influence varies over time (Amenta et al. 2002) and a state’s bureaucratic capacities to grant policy demands vary by issue (Giugni 2004). Instead, others focus on more short-term influences, such as partisanship within the government (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) or changes in public opinion (Giugni 2007). Some scholars warn, however, that the sorts of political contexts that spurred mobilization, such as the rise to power of left-wing regime for a left-wing movement (Amenta and Caren 2004) or a change in public opinion (Burstein and Linton 2002), might be responsible for political outcomes erroneously attributed to the influence of movements. Yet others (Cornwall et al. 2007) find that political contexts that aid mobilization do not promote movement influence.

This concern with political contexts led to scholars formulating models that specify the mediated or joint effects of movements’ mobilization and collective action and political contexts on policies and other political outcomes (Amenta 2006). These arguments include Piven and Cloward’s (1977) claim that mass disruption works best in situations of electoral volatility and Skocpol’s (1992) claim that, to be
politically influential in the divided US polity, movement and advocacy organizations needed to mobilize across the country.

Political mediation models take mobilization and plausible framing as necessary conditions to influence, but also hold that challengers’ action is more likely to produce results when institutional political actors see a benefit in aiding the group the challenger represents (Almeida and Stearns 1998; Kane 2003). To secure political benefits, challengers will typically need to engage in collective action that influences the thinking and action of state actors. For a movement to be influential, state actors need to see it as potentially facilitating or disrupting their own goals – augmenting or cementing new electoral coalitions, gaining in public opinion, increasing the support for the missions of governmental bureaus. More generally, the political mediation argument holds that challengers need to alter strategies and forms to address specific political contexts (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005).

Political mediation models tend to focus on “assertive” political strategies, which involve sanctions beyond disruptive or symbolic protest (Lipsky 1968) or providing information about policy preferences (Lohmann 1993). The political collective action of challengers works by demonstrating that a significant segment of the electorate cares strongly about an issue, usually with a policy preference outside the mainstream of political discussion. These assertive strategies include electioneering (seeking to punish political opponents and aid friends, or influencing party platforms), litigating in the courts, legislating new laws, and demanding the implementation of existing laws through direct action (Amenta 2006). Achieving changes in public policy using assertive means is likely to be more difficult, however, without a supportive political regime or administrative authority.

Several lines of research support these claims (see review in Amenta et al. 2010). Martin (2013) finds that anti-tax campaigns had greater impacts when the US political system was dominated by conservatives. Andrews (2004) finds that local movements had much greater influence over federal civil rights policies that provided institutional mechanisms for movement input (e.g. poverty programs) than those that did not (e.g. school desegregation). Research findings that a diversity of tactics or organizational types at the movement level produce political gains are consistent with these claims (Johnson 2008; Olzak and Ryo 2007). Some research that finds little effect of movements on policy also supports joint-effects models. Skrentny (2006) finds that white ethnic groups sought to gain affirmative action benefits, but failed because policy-makers rejected their claims. Moreover, in structurally unfavorable political contexts, where a group’s democratic rights are greatly restricted (Amenta 2006), influence over progressive policy may be extremely difficult to achieve, even when groups are mobilized. More generally, certain issues and policies may be very difficult for movements to influence, including policies closely tied to the national cleavage structure, for which high levels of political or material resources are at stake, for instance, regarding military matters, or on which public opinion is very strong (Burstein and Sausner 2005; Giugni 2004; Kriesi et al. 1995).

Some “joint effects” political mediation arguments hold that several factors must coincide to effect extensive change (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Giugni 2007; McAdam and Su 2002). In the US setting, a national challenger with far-reaching goals is likely to need a favorable partisan context, its issue already on the agenda, high challenger organization and mobilization, credible claims-making
directed at elites and the general public, and assertive action (Amenta 2006; Amenta, Caren and Olasky 2005). McAdam and Boudet (2012) find that a lack of mobilization against fracking projects in a community was sufficient to explain approval of the projects, but project rejection depended on a series of jointly occurring conditions, including other political opposition and intergovernmental conflict. The same is likely to be true for bids to transform the structural position of groups, such as through voting or civil rights. Luders (2010) argues that key civil rights legislation depended on several coinciding conditions: events by the movement that focused national attention on civil rights and brought sympathy for their demands, the electoral leverage of African Americans on northern legislators, as well as no counter-mobilization in the North from businesses or the grassroots. Others argue that public opinion must also be favorable (Giugni 2007; Olzak and Soule 2009).

What Is Studied and How

As these examples indicate, most research has been about policy, and there are reasons for this focus, aside from the fact that policies matter. Policies benefit from extensive documentation, can be divided into several processes, including introduction, votes for enactment, and implementation, and policies can be analyzed according to how many people benefit and how much is spent on them. Most of all, policies are also advantageous for study because of a well-established causal literature. The literature on the political consequences of movements has largely taken advantage of this fact, making claims about the influence of movements at various parts of the process and theorizing joint effects of movement influence with known determinants of policy outcomes. However, because most work has focused on policy change, we have less developed theories regarding the possible influence of movements on other state-related consequences.

This policy focus is particularly prominent at the subnational level. At the local level, scholars typically examine the role of movements in influencing municipalities to adopt favorable policies. For example, Vasi et al. (2015) found that showing an anti-fracking documentary as part of an environmental campaign increased the probability of subsequent mobilizations, which has a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that a city passes anti-fracking legislation. Looking beyond movement organizations, Negro, Perretti, and Carroll (2013) examined the relationship between the size and diversity of gay-friendly business and anti-discrimination legislation. In a notable exception to focusing on a policy outcome, Coe (2013) explored the determinants of subnational bureaucrats’ attitudes toward feminist issues in Peru. One significant limitation for scholars interested in municipal research is the limited nature of good political contextual variables, such as partisan control, and the overall paucity of information about municipal policies. Social movement scholars examining local politics should engage the broader scholarship on city politics and urban sociology.

Research at the US state level has also primarily explored the determinants of policy adoption. This work generally looks across states to explain the relative success of a single movement. Parris and Scheuerman (2015), for example, used hazard models to explore the impact of movement presence on hate crime legislation.
Amenta, Caren, and Olasky (2005) examined the movement and other influences on the generosity of old-age programs. In contrast to the local and state-level research, national-level work has explored a much richer variety of political consequences, from structural transformation of the state (Trevizo 2011) to executive action (Bloom 2015), to policy funding (Best 2012), to legislative attention (King, Bentele, and Soule 2007), and to the fate of individual bills (Burstein 2014). Work at the national level is also much more likely to study the impact of movements on intermediate processes for state influence, such as public opinion (Banaszak and Ondercin 2016), voter choice (Arzheimer 2009), and partisan alignments (McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014). As noted, much research focuses on the influence of movements early in the policy process. For example, Johnson, Agnone, and McCarthy (2010) found that while any type of US environmental movement activity is associated with an increase in hearings, law passage is the result of complex interactions between movements and political actors. Likewise, Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2012) found that protest influence in Belgium on legislative action varied by not only protest characteristics, but also by media coverage and issue type.

All the same, this literature faces several methodological challenges that can hinder cumulative knowledge. The first is that analyses are typically case studies of a single movement in one country, leading to a lack of comparability across contexts. It is difficult to gain relevant information on movements comparatively, and scholars have to resort to relatively thin measures of movement characteristics when examining a large number of countries. A second challenge is that some designs are better equipped to test alternative explanations, including the possibility of mediated or joint effects. Data availability is an important consideration here as well. At the national level and in some countries, there are rich and systematic data sources for quantitative analysis and extensive archival materials available to scholars, but data to gauge relevant causal factors is much sparser in historical, cross-national, and some sub-national political units. A third challenge is that when movements seek influence over policy, their opponents can vary greatly in their capacity and form, including in terms of counter-movements, political parties, and state actors. This makes identifying the causal influence of movement factors difficult.

We see several promising methodological directions developing in the literature, however. First, several recent studies have developed much stronger quantitative tests of movement influence, such as the use of fixed effect and instrumental variable models and attention to temporal heterogeneity of movement influence (Biggs and Andrews 2015; Madestam et al. 2013; McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014). Second, although most research remains focused on agenda-setting and policy adoption, there is an increasing number of studies that examine a broader range of outcomes related to policy and other political consequences, such as policy implementation or systemic effects in policy domains (Andrews 2001; Best 2012). Third, the field has moved toward greater attention to causal mechanisms, such as the relative importance of disruption or persuasion (Andrews 2001; Luders 2010). Fourth, we have also seen some expansion in the range of movements under investigation, including conservative social movements (Johnson, Scheite, and Ecklund 2016; McVeigh, Cunningham, and Farrell 2014; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink 2004; Steil and Vasi 2014), and extending this breadth further is much needed.
Finally, there are also a handful of cross-national studies (Halfmann 2011; Htun and Weldon 2012; Kadivar and Caren 2016; Schofer and Hironaka 2005) that provide potential models for scholars.

**Conclusion**

Much progress has been made in the study of the political consequences of social movements, probably more so than in other areas surrounding the influence of movements, such as biographical, cultural, or other institutional consequences (Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). But there is also much room for further work. We take off from our point that there are many political institutions, processes, and outcomes that movements seek to influence or that are of interest to the constituency of movements and make suggestions for the future.

On the methodological side, scholarship in this area has done well to apply a wide variety of techniques, ranging from standard quantitative ones to small-N comparisons and qualitative comparative analyses. All the same, most analyses have been case studies of the largest movements. It would be valuable to have more cross-movement analyses, as well as cross-national ones. But given that much future research is likely to be case studies, there can be utility added to these studies in other ways. For example, having more deep historical analyses to address major institutional changes and to appraise the mechanisms and time-order aspects of theoretical arguments holds promise for a more thorough understanding of how movements influence political outcomes or fail to do so. These sorts of analysis can range across different political processes, including all parts of the policy process. Given the variety of movements and contexts, it is critical for theory development that scholars clarify the population of similar cases.

Most existing work on the political consequences of movements concerns policy, especially establishing the connection between protest and agenda setting. Another direction for future research then is that more work is needed to address other aspects of the political process. These include changes in policy content, voting for policy changes, and the implementation of policy. Even in the area of agenda setting it would be valuable to address further the connection between different sorts of protest, media coverage, and policy agendas. In addition, scholars addressing movement influence should be aware that not all policies are the same. It is much easier to prevent the retrenchment of a long-standing policy in a movement constituency’s favor or stop a new policy initiative that a movement opposes than it is to create a new policy involving new rights or funding for movement constituencies, especially when there are better funded groups opposing them (Amenta 2006; Pierson 2000). More difficult still is for movement actors to influence long-standing policies already working against the interests of their constituents and that have established policy networks surrounding them (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Laumann and Knoke 1987). Scholars attempting to understand movement influence should keep these distinctions in mind when making arguments about which movement forms or strategies may work best.

Scholars also need to move beyond policy to include addressing further the influence of movements on elections, political parties, administrative agencies, and
courts and legal systems. The greatest progress will be made if scholars take a similar approach to those studying policy: following closely the academic debates and findings surrounding the determinants of the outcome in question and theorizing movement influence as either affecting these determinants, mediating their influence, or providing separate routes to influence. Following this suggestion would also mean becoming expert in the literature on the outcome in question and employing its concepts and theories, while working what we know about the influence of movements into them. In this way, what we know about movement influence can be theorized and analyzed further, alongside and in conjunction with the other determinants of political processes and outcomes.

References


POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES, OUTCOMES MOVEMENTS SEEK TO INFLUENCE


