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9 **Racial, ethnic, and immigration protest during year one of the Trump presidency**

Kenneth T. Andrews, Neal Caren and Todd Lu

Protest was a defining feature of Trump's first year in office. On January 21, one day following the inauguration, over four million people participated in the Women's March—one of the largest days of protest in U.S. history (Chenoweth and Pressman 2017). In the year that followed, over six thousand protest events were held with a cumulative attendance of more than 1,700,000 people.

Activists have mobilized around an incredibly diverse set of issues including immigration, health care, the environment, science and education, abortion rights, and racism. This diversity is reflected in the motivations of protest participants as well (Fisher, Dow, and Ray 2017). While some of the issues have clustered into distinct waves, others have been a continuing focus of activists since Trump's inauguration.

A central component of this diversity of issues was protests against racism and President Trump's immigration policies. One quarter of protest events and protesters during this period were concerned with these domains, from the nearly 180,000 people who protested Trump's proposed Muslim travel ban to almost 100,000 people who protested against the violence arising from the alt-right's Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville.

The targets and sites of protest have been diverse as well. Activists have staged protests at conventional sites like the national mall, state capitols, and college campuses and less common ones like airports and NFL stadiums. While the issues and targets of protest have been diverse, the tactical repertoire has been dominated by rallies, marches, and demonstrations. However, activists have employed innovative and more disruptive protest forms at times over the past year, including the airport protest. In addition, some of the most contentious protests have happened where demonstrators and counter-demonstrators face off such as the Confederate monuments protests.

We examine racial and ethnic protest during the first year of Trump's presidency. Our analysis has two goals: (1) to provide a comprehensive description of these protests including the scope and issues that have defined activism over this year and (2) to explore competing explanations for the movement's mobilization at the local level with a focus on protest concerning racial, ethnic and

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immigration issues. Specifically, we examine the ways that partisanship, movement infrastructure, and sociodemographic characteristics of communities shape the patterning of racial and immigration protest events.

Documenting protest

We use protest event data to estimate the count and size of protest against the Trump administration and its policies between January 20, 2017 and January 19, 2018. Our event data is primarily based on the Crowd Counting Consortium's (CCC) monthly crowd data (<https://sites.google.com/view/crowdcountingconsortium>). Spearheaded by Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth, the consortium collects "publicly available data on political crowds reported in the United States, including marches, protests, strikes, demonstrations, riots, and other actions" (n.d.). The data are produced through volunteer research assistants who review the results of a news crawl combined with user-submitted reports. The full dataset for each month is made available on the CCC website. While the CCC includes all political crowds, we restrict our analysis to events that oppose President Trump or his policies. This excludes a number of local events and pro-Trump events. Additionally, we exclude the LGBT Pride Parades that occurred in late March, as those annual events vary substantially in their political emphasis (Bruce 2016).

To fill in a temporal gap between January 21 and January 31 where CCC did not track events, we supplement these data with information from Count Love (<https://countlove.org>), a project led Tommy Leung and Nathan Perkins. Similar to CCC, Count Love data are based on a news crawl with additional human and machine learning coding (Leung and Perkins 2017).

CCC and Count Love datasets produce conservative estimates of crowd sizes by averaging multiple reports, discounting self-reports, and converting verbal descriptions of crowds to lowest plausible integers (e.g., "hundreds" is translated to 200). For 26 percent of events ($n = 1,704$), we were not able to establish reliable crowd estimates primarily because they were not reported in the source. In these cases, we imputed a size of 11, based on our understanding that these events often appeared to be small based on the tone of the article. Combined, we estimate that there were 1,962,457 protest participants. Our robustness check found similar coefficients and effect sizes for all models with and without the imputation.

Our team of research assistants reviewed each CCC and Count Love event. We coded each event on a variety of additional measures, including the topic and issue of the event, whether or not protest was part of a national wave of protests, among others. For example, we estimate that there were 310 protests against President Trump's proposed travel ban, part of 942 protests around a broader issue of immigration. Our coding of issues covers eleven major categories and over two dozen sub-categories, but our analysis in this chapter focuses on the two major issues of race and immigration. Admittedly, there is some overlap between these categories, and some events focus on multiple issues. Here, we have focused on the primary issues based on our coding of the event as described in media reports.

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Patterning of protest: descriptive analysis

Nearly one-quarter of the protests in the first year of Trump's presidency were related to immigration or race. Of the eight thousand protest events we have counted, approximately 12 percent were immigration-related, and 12 percent were race-related. Their salience should not be surprising due to the Trump administration's rhetoric and policies that directly targeted racial and ethnic minorities, and his political support by, and connections to, overt White supremacists (Bobo 2017). In total, there were nearly 620,000 participants involved in 2,410 race or immigration-related protests during this period. Protests were also widespread, organized in 505 counties across all US states.

Although events were regularly sustained throughout the year, we identify two major protest waves and several smaller ones against the Trump administration. The first significant wave included protests around the immigration-related refugee and Muslim travel ban, occurring at the end of January and beginning February 2017. The second major wave included anti-racist protests organized in response to the Unite the Right rally and violence in Charlottesville in

mid-August 2017. The monthly count of all protest events is shown in Figure 9.1. Next, we describe the patterning of protest related to race and immigration in greater detail.

Protests focused on immigrants and immigration

Among all immigration protests, we identified six major issues. These are the Travel Ban (39 percent of all immigration protests), Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (23 percent), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids (13 percent), Day without Immigrants (11 percent), May Day (8 percent), and Sanctuary Cities (5 percent). Furthermore, we identified four major protest clusters or waves throughout the first year of the Trump administration. The first wave emerged in late January and throughout February 2017. Activists first organized in late January against the Trump administration's refugee and Muslim travel ban and later organized protests in February for the Day without Immigrant demonstrations and against resurgent ICE raids. The second protest wave flared up in May 2017, mostly related to May Day protests around the country. The final two protest waves erupted in September 2017 and December 2017. These later protests were organized to advocate for the protection of DACA and DACA recipients. One wave was sparked in early September when the Trump administration announced plans to phase out the DACA program (Sacchetti and Stein 2017). Immigrant-rights groups organized the second protest wave in December to pressure US Congressional members to pass legislation protecting Dreamers and DACA before the end of the year (Siegel 2017). In total, we counted 1211 immigration-related events involving 368,000 protesters. These events were geographically widespread, occurring in 324 different counties in all 50 states.

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


Figure 9.1 Monthly count of protest events by issue focus, 2017.

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The average size of protests was 304 participants, with a median of 70. Protests were nearly all rallies and demonstrations (94%) and targeted the federal government (85%) and state or local governments (10%).

The first major immigration issue represented the refugee and Muslim travel ban. On January 27, 2017, the Trump administration signed into effect an executive order to temporarily suspend entry into the United States all refugees (indefinitely for Syrian refugees) and citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. The nature and implementation of the order and initial reports that US airport security immediately detained affected peoples sparked widespread protests throughout the end of January and beginning of February (Bacon and Gomez 2017). Unlike the highly coordinated Women's Marches in the week before, the travel ban protests were notable for their spontaneity and non-traditional venues, with many participants converging at airports. In total, we identified 309 events involving nearly 180,000 protesters. Events were widespread across 101 counties and 39 states. Protests were generally large: an average of 581 protesters per event and a median of 200 protesters.

The second major immigration issue involved protests related to the DACA program. Implemented by President Obama on June 2012, DACA enabled undocumented people brought to the US as children to apply for and receive renewable two-year work permits and deferred action from deportations. Hundreds of thousands of undocumented youth applied for and received DACA status, benefiting from greater access to jobs, financial services, educational opportunities, and health care (Gonzales et al. 2014).

Nonetheless, the Trump administration announced to phase out DACA on September 5, 2017 (Shear and Davis 2017), sparking protests from thousands of DACA recipients and allies. The second wave of DACA protests erupted in the first week of December, right before the congressional recess. Thousands sought to pressure members of Congress to pass legislation to protect the DACA program and its recipients. In total, we identified 181 DACA-related events involving nearly 30,000 protesters. DACA protests were present in 106 counties in 35 states. Events featured an average of 162 protesters and a median of 24 protesters.

The third major immigration issue was ICE raids. Under President Obama, ICE deported millions of undocumented immigrants, directing ICE to prioritize those with serious criminal records (Law 2017). Through an executive order signed in early January 2017, President Trump expanded the powers of immigration officers to detain and deport undocumented immigrants and broadened the definition of groups prioritized for deportation to include most undocumented immigrants (Kopan 2017). Throughout the first year of the Trump presidency, ICE initiated numerous raids and arrests, leading to an uptick of arrests and deportations of undocumented peoples across the United States (Bialik 2018). Immigration-rights activists and community groups mobilized in response to ICE raids in their local communities. In total, we identified 98 events involving around 10,000 protesters. Unlike other issue-related protests, ICE raid protests were sustained throughout the year.

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We identified four different peaks in February, March, and August of 2017 and January of 2018. ICE protests were much more geographically concentrated, occurring only in 57 counties across 30 states. Events had an average of 104 protesters and a median of 34 protesters.

The fourth major immigration issue was the Day Without Immigrant marches. On February 16, 2017, demonstrators called for nationwide rallies, strikes, and boycotts to protest against Trump's immigration policies and to showcase the importance of immigrants in the US economy (Robbins and Correal 2017). In total, we counted 87 events across 76 counties in 32 states, involving just over 30,000 protesters. Nearly all events were organized on February 16, with a few organized the next day. Some "Day Without Immigrant" events resurfaced months later during May 1 protests. Events on average had 352 protesters and a median of 50 protesters. Among events with tactics data available (38 events), half of the events involved strikes, walkouts, and lockouts while the other half involved rallies and demonstrations.

The fifth major immigration issue was May Day protests. While May Day events, occurring on the first day of May, historically celebrate the international labor movement, the 2017 May Day protests extensively took on immigrant rights in opposition to Trump's immigration policies (Francescani and Dobuzinskis 2017). In total, nearly 50,000 protesters came out to 64 events. May Day events were organized in 53 counties across 25 states, with events on average featuring 748 protesters and a median of 180 protesters.

The sixth major immigration issue was sanctuary city protests. Activists organized to pressure local municipalities to adopt sanctuary city statuses, which refer to municipalities that, by law or practice, prevent local law enforcement from questioning detained individuals about their immigration status or from notifying ICE federal agents of detained undocumented immigrants (Ridgley 2008). Although sanctuary cities predate the Trump administration, they have taken on a renewed importance as more undocumented immigrants and their allies seek local protections from federal deportations. Furthermore, the Trump administration publicly criticized cities that proclaimed sanctuary status, threatening to cut off federal funding or intentionally targeting sanctuary cities for ICE raids (Kaste 2017). Similar to the ICE-raids protests, sanctuary-city protests were sustained throughout the year, peaking in periods of other immigration protest waves in February and May 2017. In total, there were 39 events involving just over 4,000 protesters. Events featured on average 107 protesters and a median of 90 protesters and were dispersed in 25 counties across 13 states. As expected, the vast majority of these protests (82 percent) targeted state and local governments in support of sanctuary city policies, as we do not include pro-Trump rallies and protests in our data.

Protests focused on race and racial inequality

There were three major issues among race-related protests: Charlottesville/Confederate monuments (67 percent of all race-related protests), the national

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anthem (17 percent), and Black Lives Matter (9 percent). Events peaked three times during the year. First, demonstrations during August 2017 emerged in the wake of the violence at Charlottesville and against local Confederate monuments. Second, protests from September to December 2017 were national anthem related by NFL football players in the 2017 NFL season. Finally, January 2018 witnessed many rallies and demonstrations during the Martin Luther King Day weekend around racial equality and in commemoration of Dr. King's legacy. In total, we counted 1,197 race-related events, involving 247,600 protesters. Events were geographically widespread, occurring across 403 counties in all 50 states. The average event included 207 protesters, with a median of 34 protesters. Protests were mostly rallies and demonstrations (90 percent), with some vigils and other symbolic displays, 6 percent and 2 percent respectively. Protesters had a large variety of targets, but top ones were the general public (52 percent), local and state governments (26 percent), the federal government (5 percent), and other protesters (5 percent).

The first major issue revolved around the violence in Charlottesville and of Confederate monuments. These protests were organized in response to the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville on August 12, 2017. A coalition of White supremacists, neo-Confederates, neo-Nazis, and far-right militias describing themselves as the "alt-right" rallied against the removal of a Confederate monument by the city of Charlottesville (Fausset and Feuer 2017). In response, anti-racist and anti-fascist protesters organized a counter-rally to confront the far-right demonstrators. National news reported the alt-right activists' attacks against the University of Virginia students during an evening march on campus the night before (Pearce 2017) and violent street clashes between the far-right demonstrators and anti-racist activists the next day. Most notably, a White supremacist protester rammed a car at high speed into a crowd of anti-racist demonstrators, injuring dozens and killing anti-racist activist Heather Heyer (Silverman and Laris 2017). Although mainstream politicians and civil rights organizations condemned the violence and events, President Trump's initial remarks on the rally failed to condemn the far right, claiming there were "very fine people on both sides" (Thrush and Haberman 2017). These events led to widespread protests around the country against the White supremacist violence in Charlottesville, against Trump's comments, and local Confederate monuments. We counted a total of 337 protest events, involving nearly 100,000 protesters. These peaked in the week after the Unite the Right rally and organized across 215 counties in 46 states. The average event had 295 protesters with a median of 63 protesters. Although most were rallies and demonstrations, a significant portion (17 percent) were vigils in commemoration of Heather Heyer. Protests targeted the general public (75 percent), but a significant minority of protests targeted parts of local and state government (15 percent) and other protesters (6 percent).

The second major issue was national anthem protests (Weffer et al. 2018). Many high-profile NFL football players participated in these events throughout the 2017 NFL season, between September and December 2017.

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In total, we counted 88 national anthem events involving approximately 1600 total protesters. NFL players and allies were inspired by NFL player Colin Kaepernick's protests against police brutality of Blacks and US racism at the start of the 2016 NFL preseason. When the national anthem played at NFL games, Kaepernick consistently sat and knelt instead of standing. Explaining his actions, he stated to the media, "I am not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for a country that oppresses black people and people of color" (Wyche 2016). President Trump weighed in on national anthem protests in the next NFL season, tweeting on September 24, 2017 for NFL owners to fire players who refuse to pledge to the anthem (Phillip and Boren 2017). Many NFL players responded, protesting during the national anthem and issuing statements against Trump's comments and in opposition to US racism. These protests persisted throughout the 2017 NFL season across 48 counties in 28 states. Events were much smaller but still significant due to the high-profile involvement of NFL players. The average size of each event was 18, with a median of 5 protesters. In general, protests targeted the general public (84 percent).

The third major issue was Black Lives Matter protests. The Black Lives Matter movement received national attention in August 2014 when activists in Ferguson, Missouri demonstrated against the killing of Black teenager Michael Brown by White police officer Darren Wilson. In the years that followed, the movement has sustained repeated and widespread protests around Black victims who are brutalized and killed by police officers, drawing attention to more extensive systematic racism against Blacks in the US (Williamson et al. 2018). Throughout the Trump's first year, the Black Lives movement continued to sustain protests, with modest peaks in April, June, and July 2017. In total, we counted 45 events involving nearly 11,000 protesters spread across 32 counties in 19 states. We found that these protests mostly occurred in response to recent police killings of Black people. These include commemorative demonstrations that linked local Black victims of police violence to more well-known names like Michael Brown and Philando Castile, against local law-enforcement agencies and following local judicial proceedings. The average event size was 242 and a median of 55 protesters. Protesters mostly targeted officials and agencies in state and local governments (56 percent), but also targeted the general public in many cases (31 percent).

Why do communities protest about immigration and race?

The recent protest wave following Trump's election has raised important questions about the social bases for protest – who is participating and why – as well as questions about the persistence and potential impact of these mobilizations. We examine why some communities mobilized with higher intensity than others during the first year of Trump's presidency. We draw on prevailing theories and prior research in social movement studies to guide our analysis.

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Partisanship and electoral mobilization

Scholars are paying increasing attention to the links between social movements, political parties, and elections. Although political process theorists included this as part of a larger political opportunity structure, most empirical analyses in this tradition only considered broad structural features of the political system such as the presence of elite allies or major electoral realignments. In recent years, scholars have looked more closely at the interactions and overlap between movements and parties (Almeida 2010, Heaney and Rojas 2015, McAdam and Tarrow 2010, Schlozman 2015). In the US context, this recent work has been motivated by efforts to understand the impact that movements have had on the party system and as a potential contributor to political polarization (Heaney 2017, McAdam and Kloos 2014).

Even before Trump won the election, the relationship between social movements and political parties had received substantial attention. Scholars had focused on the rise of the Tea Party, and its impact on the Republican Party (Almeida and Van Dyke 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Even Obama's first campaign borrowed heavily on organizing models developed by social movements and community organizers (McKenna and Han 2014). More recently, both Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump's primary campaigns in 2016 were built with connections to grassroots movements on the left and right, respectively.

With recent race and immigration protest, we ask how much this activism is a direct outgrowth of electoral mobilization. We consider the effect of partisan electoral support as well as the separate effects of relative support for establishment and insurgent candidates during the Democratic primary.

Movement infrastructure and spillover

Protest builds on the infrastructure from prior waves of activism (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Morris 1981; Terriquez 2015). By leveraging the leadership, communication networks, and prior experience of established organizations, activists can quickly mobilize large groups through bloc recruitment (Oberschall 1973) and drawing on the rituals and identities of the broader social movement community (Staggenborg 1998).

Protests in the Trump era were preceded by two major race and immigration movements. First, the Black Lives Matter movement rallied Black communities and allies to protest systematic racism and police brutality against Black people. As Oliver's Chapter 3 in this volume explains, the movement grew in the wake of protests against the 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman, a White-passing Latino man who shot to death Black teenager Trayvon Martin and came to be identified with the hashtag and organization founded by three Black women (Garza 2014). In the years that followed, Black Lives Matter activists mobilized in hundreds of cities, bringing national media attention to not only police brutality against Blacks, but also the continued racism and

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economic neglect of Black communities in colorblind America (Taylor 2016). Activists later formed federated chapters of the Black Lives Matter Network and further organized themselves with other black advocacy organizations into the Movement for Black Lives (Morice 2015).

Second, the most prominent pre-Trump era immigration protest wave was the 2006 immigration reform protests. Millions of people mobilized in hundreds of cities to protest congressional legislation that sought to further criminalize undocumented immigrants and curtail unauthorized immigration. Civil society organizations and ethnic media played important roles in organizing Latino communities to marches and demonstrations (Rim 2009). The movement represented a potential turning point leading to greater Latino engagement in US politics (Zepeda-Millán 2017; Voss and Bloemraad 2011).

We expect that communities with a history of these events are more likely to see related anti-Trump protests focused on immigration and race, with established movement organizations and prior movement activity facilitating the upsurge of protest during the Trump presidency.

Threatened groups and movement constituencies

Social movement theory and research has long recognized that groups may mobilize in response to real or perceived threats (Almeida 2003, Andrews and Seguin 2015, Einwohner and Maher 2011, Maher 2010, Zepeda-Millán 2016), especially where groups see conventional politics as providing no viable support for their claims within the political system or where groups experience declines in economic, political, or social status (McVeigh 2009).

This recent work has led to a rethinking of conventional political opportunity structure arguments which hold that movements emerge in the presence of favorable political circumstances. While favorable or improving political conditions may spur some kinds of activism or movements (McAdam 1982), threats can create a greater sense of urgency, especially for groups that have the capacity to organize and carry out protests (Almeida 2018). The “suddenly imposed grievance” argument applies to the entire wave of protest after Trump’s victory, but we may ask whether the places where more people are threatened have higher or lower levels of protest. Although our main expectation is that threatened groups will be more likely to mobilize, the relationship could go the other direction because groups targeted by political elites and authorities may be especially vulnerable to repression or face additional barriers to mobilization (Oliver 2017).

Trump’s presidency presents an ideal case to assess this line of argument. Throughout the primaries and presidential campaign, Trump and his supporters targeted numerous groups, including minorities, immigrants, and women. In addition, Trump’s attacks on science, environmentalism, and expert knowledge posed additional threats to universities and higher education.

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Assessing whether threat drives protest is difficult. In rare cases, scholars have access to individual-level data, including information about perceptions of risk or harm. More often, scholars examine the relative size of threatened groups, which provides indirect evidence (Van Dyke et al. 2002). However, the relative size of a threatened group simultaneously indicates the potential efficacy of its constituency. Nevertheless, the central role of threat in the rhetoric of Trump and his supporters, as well as its perception among movement activists, suggest that threat may be an essential component of recent protest activity.

We focus on whether communities with a larger share of minority and foreign-born were more likely to mobilize, particular around issues relevant to those communities.

Country-level data

Since we are interested in the impact of local contextual factors on protest, our unit of analysis is US counties, which is a frequently used geospatial unit to analyze social movements and protest (e.g., McVeigh et al. 2014). In our analysis, we exclude Washington, DC, as its unique focus of presidential protest is likely influenced more by national than local contexts. Since all events in both datasets are coded with city and state, we used the geocod.io API to locate each protest event within a US county.

We include multiple measures of threat to capture characteristics of communities that would be especially vulnerable to policies proposed by the Trump administration. To measure racial groups that would be threatened, we include the proportion African American and proportion Latinx using the Census's American Community Survey (ACS) aggregated by Hamner (2016). We also include a measure of the proportion of residents foreign born in a county (also based on ACS data) because anti-immigrant ideas and policies have been central to Trump's campaign and presidency.

To measure local political beliefs, we include the share of votes in the 2016 presidential election who voted for Hillary Clinton, the Democratic nominee, aggregated by Hamner (2016). The second measure of local partisans is based on donation data. Here, we aggregate Federal Elections Committee reports to count the number of donors in 2016 to Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, her most notable opponent in the Democratic primary. Our donation rates are the number of donors per 1,000 county residents.

We employ multiple measures of local social movement strength based on the past protest activity of progressive movements and local presence of advocacy organizations. We choose three movements to measure local movement strength: Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and the 2006 Immigration Reform protests. These movements represent the most prominent US protests around progressive issues in the past decade. First, we measure Occupy Wall Street protests using the list of protest occupations aggregated by Simon Rogers at the *Guardian* newspaper (2011). Second, we measure Black Lives Matter protests from Alisa Robinson's repository of BLM protest

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events (<https://elephrame.com/textbook/BLM/chart>). We include all events that occurred prior to 2017. Third, we measure the 2006 immigration reform protests based on data on size and location of events collected by Xóchitl Bada, Jonathan Fox, Elvia Zazueta, and Ingrid García (2006). Finally, we measure the strength of existing organizations using the number of entities in the county in the “Civil Rights, Social Action, and Advocacy” category in the IRS’s list of tax-exempt entities. These data are from the National Center for Charitable Statistics as constructed by McVeigh et al. (2014).

We include several county-level control variables: population size, median income, median commute time. Of note, we include commute time as protest events may be less likely to occur in sprawling suburbs with a geographic focus for events. The Gini measure is from McVeigh et al. (2014), and the other three controls are from the ACS.

Patterning of protest: regression analysis for country

We examine patterns in the geographic distribution of protests. Here our focus is on comparing the cumulative turnout in protests events, focusing on differences in the correlates of events with racial focus and immigration focus. The dependent variable is cumulative attendance at protests coded as either racial (Model 1 and 2) or Immigration (Model 3 and 4). Models 2 and 4 control for the attendance at the 2017 Women’s March because these initial protests likely spurred subsequent mobilization. To control for the skew in the data, we use an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which can be interpreted as similar to log transformation but has the advantage of being defined when the dependent value is 0.

Table 9.1 reports the impact of political, movement, and threat factors on the size of protest attendance for racial and immigration protests. Partisanship is a critical factor for both type of events, with attendance positively correlated with Democratic voting patterns. Counties where Hillary Clinton, the Democratic nominee in 2016, did well had more protesters than counties where she fared poorly. However, the Democratic vote share is no longer significant after controlling for turnout in the prior Women’s March.

Movement infrastructure also mattered for both types of protests. Notably, all three measures of previous protest activity, Occupations, BLM, and 2006 immigration protests, were each positively associated with attendance at both kinds of protest events. The impact of previous immigration protests spilled over to 2017 racial protests, and, likewise, earlier BLM protests positively impacted 2017 immigration protests. The presence of local advocacy organizations was positively related to attendance at racial protests (without controlling for Women’s March turnout) but not immigration protests.

While there is no evidence of an impact of our threat measures on attendance at racial protests, the percentage foreign-born in a county was positively correlated with attendance at immigration protests. This relationship is likely because foreign-born populations were more directly threatened by proposed Trump

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Table 9.1 Regression analysis of cumulative county anti-Trump protests attendance, 2017

	<i>Race</i>	<i>Immigration</i>
<i>Partisan:</i>		
% Dem Vote 2016	0.107** (2.82)	0.132*** (3.86)
<i>Movement Infrastructure:</i>		
OWS occupation	0.329*** (10.52)	0.485*** (17.07)
BLM Protests	0.423*** (13.74)	0.336*** (12.03)
2006 Immigration Protests	0.372*** (12.53)	0.407*** (15.10)
Advocacy orgs, rate	0.072** (2.63)	-0.000 (-0.01)
<i>Threat:</i>		
Black, %	-0.031 (-0.94)	-0.097** (-3.25)
Latinx, %	-0.058 (-1.59)	-0.042 (-1.27)
Foreign born, %	0.046 (1.11)	0.211*** (5.65)
<i>Controls:</i>		
Median income, ln	-0.111** (-3.01)	-0.034 (-1.03)
College grad, %	0.259*** (6.21)	0.161*** (4.26)
Population, ln	0.468*** (12.42)	0.312*** (9.15)
Commute time	-0.085** (-3.18)	-0.013 (-0.53)
Constant	0.734*** (30.32)	0.620*** (28.22)
Observations	3139	3139

Notes: All explanatory variables standardized. Dependent variable transformed using inverse hyperbolic sine to control for skew. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

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administration policies and responded in those places with greater constituencies. The pattern related to race is more surprising because the initial wave of Black Lives Matter protest was shaped by the racial composition of localities (Williamson et al. 2018). However, those protests were spurred by local threats of lethal policing in Black communities. By contrast, many of the race-focused protests were mobilized as resistance to statements by Trump or in solidarity with protesters against the racial violence in Charlottesville. In other words, they had become nationalized. In contrast, Zepeda-Millán and Wallace (2018) find that immigrant rights activists have shifted their strategies downward as the national political opportunity structure has become more hostile. Thus, the specific form of threat is critical in determining whether local population characteristics shape protest.

Conclusion

Overall, we find that nonviolent racial and immigration protests were a central part of the Resistance protest events during 2017. Combined, they constituted a quarter of anti-Trump protests during this period. While events occurred frequently, there were several periods of high-intensity activism, in particular on the immigration ban and Charlottesville's Unite the Right event. In our regression analysis, we find that attendance at protests on racial and immigration issues was highest in Democratic counties with a prior history of activism. When the level of Women's March protests was controlled, the effect of Democratic voting went to zero, implying that partisanship promoted overall protests but not an especially high focus on Black issues or immigrants. We do find that the size of the immigrant population affected pro-immigrant protests, but there was no effect of Black population size on Black movement protests.

We also highlight relevant limitations of our data and analysis. Our reliance on media reports of protest for our primary dependent variables entails the usual limitations of potential reporting biases. Nevertheless, two characteristics of our data mitigate these concerns. First, we rely on a large number of sources overcoming the typical biases associated with using a small number of news agencies. Second, we focus on a period of heightened public attention to the protest that kept activism and resistance to the Trump administration as a central focus of reporters throughout the period of study.

In this chapter, we have focused on protest events, but it is important to note that activism has taken many other forms. For example, there has been ongoing litigation against Trump administration policies and opposition from employees in federal agencies. Several thousand local organizations affiliated with a national network, indivisible.org. Nevertheless, understanding the scope of protest and the forces driving it is important for multiple reasons.

First, protest spurs other forms of activism by drawing people into more sustained participation and organizing, by working in tandem with litigation and other tactics, and by inspiring different kinds of resistance. Second,

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although too early to gauge with precision, protest likely shapes broader attention to activist's grievances and claims and US politics. For example, Collingwood, Lajevardi, and Oskooii's (2018) analysis of the Muslim Ban indicates that protest helped shift public opinion against it. Protest may be shaping other political dynamics by expanding support for organizations opposed to the administration and its policies.

Our analyses document the centrality of immigration and race to emerging opposition to the Trump administration, and they motivate several questions for future scholarship.

Comparatively, it will be important to examine the way different constituencies respond to multiple threats. In this case, this includes racial groups and immigrants as we have done and other groups such as teachers, scientists, and LGBTQ communities. Looking forward, this case also presents opportunities for understanding the consequences of protest and movements include possible impacts on public opinion, political parties, and public policy.

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